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Abstract 
Research-based spin-offs have become an important research subject, given their role as 
technology transfer mechanisms. They have been found to have a significant economic 
impact, both on the parent organisation and on regional and national development.   
This thesis is particularly concerned with three key aspects of RBSO behaviour. The first 
study analyses the determinants of the variation on the RBSOs creation across regions. 
Using a unique self-collected dataset on the population of RBSOs created in Portugal 
between 1979 and 2007, it investigates the intensity of spin-off formation across regions, 
focusing on the characteristics of the region where the spin-off is created and those of 
universities located in the region. The results indicate that the quality and prestige of the 
universities, and the presence of university-affiliated incubators or research parks, on the 
one hand, and regional characteristics such as the availability of qualified human capital and 
regional demand size, on the other hand, influence the intensity of RBSO creation.  
The second study analyses the survival of the population of Portuguese RBSOs, from its 
inception in 1979 until 2007, also using a unique data set. It investigates the role of three 
types of effects on firm’ survival: founding conditions, parent organisation characteristics 
and characteristics of the region. The results show that start-up size, firm age, parent 
reputation and region characteristics are key determinants of RBSOs survival 
The third study addresses the commercialisation decisions of RBSOs. Using cross-country 
data collected on the basis of questionnaire-based interviews, it focuses on the case of 
companies that target the market for technologies and investigates the conditions that 
influence the decision to adopt and the ability to pursue with this commercialisation 
strategy. The results suggest that these are determined by: the novelty of the technology 
being commercialised and the capacity to protect it since start-up; the situation in terms of 
access to downstream complementary assets, in particular the extent to which incumbent 
companies control those assets; the competence mix of the founding team. The research 
also calls the attention to the impact of early decisions, which can constrain firms’ 
subsequent behaviour by reducing the margin for future choices.  
The results from these studies provide some new insights into three important aspects of 
RBSOs behaviour – formation, strategy formulation and survival – highlighting conditions 
that enable them to perform a role in economic development. They offer some theoretical 
and empirical contributions to the literature on RBSOs and can also provide some 
guidelines for the formulation of more adequate policies to support RBSO development.  
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Resumo 
As empresas spin-offs de investigação tornaram-se um importante objecto de pesquisa, 
dada a sua função enquanto de mecanismos de transferência de tecnologia, que lhes 
confere um papel significativo, quer ao nível da instituição de origem, quer em termos de 
desenvolvimento económico regional e nacional. 
Esta tese incide em três aspectos fundamentais do comportamento dos spin-offs. O 
primeiro estudo analisa os determinantes da variação na criação de spin-offs entre regiões. 
A partir de uma base de dados única da população de spin-offs criados em Portugal entre 
1979 e 2007, investiga o impacto das características da região e das características das 
universidades localizadas nessa região na intensidade de spin-offs aí criados. Os resultados 
apontam para o papel da qualidade e prestígio das universidades, da presença de 
incubadoras e/ou parques de ciência e tecnologia, bem como de características regionais, 
como a disponibilidade de capital humano qualificado e a dimensão da procura regional. 
O segundo estudo analisa os determinantes da sobrevivência da população de spin-offs 
portuguesas, desde 1979 até 2007, também a partir de uma base de dados única. É 
investigado o papel das condições de criação, das características da instituição de origem e 
das características da região. Os resultados mostram que a dimensão da empresa à data de 
criação, a idade, a reputação da instituição de origem e as características da região são os 
principais determinantes da sobrevivência das empresas spin-offs.  
O terceiro estudo aborda as decisões de comercialização das empresas spin-offs. Usando 
dados internacionais recolhidos através de entrevistas baseadas em questionário, aborda o 
caso das empresas que têm como alvo o mercado de tecnologias e investiga as condições 
que influenciam a decisão de adoptar e a possibilidade de prosseguir esta estratégia. Os 
resultados apontam para: a novidade da tecnologia comercializada e a capacidade de a 
proteger; as condições de acesso a activos complementares, nomeadamente o grau controlo 
destes por incumbentes; o mix de competências da equipa fundadora. Também é realçado 
o impacto das decisões iniciais, que podem reduzir a margem para escolhas futuras. 
Os resultados destes estudos oferecem contributos teóricos e empíricos para três aspectos 
chave do comportamento das empresas spin-offs – criação, formulação de estratégia e 
sobrevivência - com destaque para as condições que lhes permitem desempenhar um papel 
no desenvolvimento económico. Também fornecem algumas pistas para a formulação de 
políticas mais adequadas para apoiar o desenvolvimento deste grupo de empresas. 
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I. Introduction 
1. Research-based spin-offs as a research topic  
The motivation for this thesis is the growing importance that both the academic literature 
and technology and innovation policies attribute to research-based spin-off firms (RBSOs).  
Although there is not, in the literature, a single definition of the concept of academic or 
research-based spin-offs, it is possible to describe them as firms whose creation is based on 
the formal and/or informal transfer of knowledge or technology generated in public 
research organisations (Djokovic and Souitaris, 2008; Mustar et al., 2006; Pirnay et al 2003).  
In fact, RBSOs have been found to play an important role in the commercial exploitation 
of knowledge originating from research (Rothaermel el al., 2007; Wright et al., 2007). Given 
their function as a mechanism of technology transfer, RBSOs can have a significant 
economic impact - particularly in emerging fields - not only on the “parent” university, but 
also on regional and national development (Fini et al., 2011; Mustar et al., 2006; O´Shea et 
al., 2008; Wright et al., 2007).  
These features made RBSOs particularly attractive to policy makers at various levels 
(institutional, regional, national, European), who have launched a variety of policies 
promoting their creation, in the expectation of extensive economic and social benefits 
(Claryssse et al., 2011; Mustar et al., 2008; Wright et al., 2007). However, contrary to what 
is often assumed by policy makers, RBSOs are heterogeneous companies, created in a 
diversity of conditions and displaying a variety of behaviours, with implications for the 
role(s) they effectively play in the transformation of scientific and technological knowledge 
into economic value (Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004; Heirman and Clarysse, 2004; Helm and 
Mauroner, 2007; Mustar et al., 2006). Thus, it is relevant to go into greater depth into the 
formation and behaviour of this type of company.  
In this thesis we are particularly concerned with three key aspects of RBSO behaviour. 
Firstly, we look at the process of RBSO formation. Because these firms are often described 
as having an important role in regional development, we analyse the determinants of the 
intensity of the RBSOs creation across regions. Secondly, we address RBSOs survival. 
Technology-intensive companies in general and RBSO in particular are described as having 
a lower mortality rate than the average entrepreneurial start-up. Thus, we are interested in 
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uncovering the determinants of RBSO survival, since their economic impact also depends 
on their ability to pursue with innovative activities over time. Thirdly, we address the 
process of commercialisation conducted by RBSOs. Since the value attributed to these 
companies largely rests on their ability to develop and bring to the market knowledge 
originating from academic research, we investigate the condition in which RBSOs perform 
this task and the resulting commercialisation strategies. 
The research conducted along these lines will be briefly summarised below and will be 
developed in the following chapters, as autonomous papers. The results from these three 
studies provide some new insights into three important aspects of RBSOs behaviour – 
formation, strategy formulation and survival – highlighting conditions that enable them to 
perform a role in economic development. They offer some theoretical and empirical 
contributions to the literature on RBSOs and can also provide some guidelines for policy 
makers, enabling them to formulate policies that are more adequate to support RBSO 
development. 
2. Overview of studies 
2.1. Entry by research-based spin-offs   
Recent studies show an increase in the number of research-based spin-offs (RBSOs) since 
the mid-nineties. According to a report of the Association of University Technology 
Managers (AUTM, 2007) over 5000 spin-offs were created in the U.S. between 1980 and 
2005 were created, this increase registering their maximum values in the nineties. In 
Europe there was also a significant increase in the number of RBSOs, mainly from the late 
1990s onwards (van Looy et al., 2011; Wright et al., 2007).  
Given the increase of spin-off activity, the analysis of the determinants of RBSO creation 
became one of the major research streams on university entrepreneurship. The literature 
concerning entrepreneurial activity, points out several factors as relevant to the creation of 
spin-offs (Asterbo and Bazzazian, 2011; Djokovic and Souitaris, 2008; Gilsing et al., 2010; 
O´Shea et al., 2008; Rothaermel el al., 2007). In this paper we will address this issue from a 
regional perspective, investigating the determinants of the variation in RBSO creation 
across regions. Using a unique self-collected set of data, we analyze the impact of factors 
related to the characteristics of the existing universities in the region – as a source of 
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knowledge spillovers and supplier of resources – as well as other regional characteristics, in 
the intensity of RBSO creation in a given region.  
Our results suggest that the quality and prestige of the universities located in a municipality, 
as well as the presence of university-affiliated incubators and/or university research parks 
have a positive impact on the intensity of RBSO creation. Regarding the regional 
characteristics, the availability of qualified human capital and the regional demand size also 
seem to have an important effect on spin-off intensity across regions. 
 
2.2. Determinants of research-based spin-offs survival  
Existing literature has shown that research-based spin-offs firms usually exhibit lower 
death risks than other start-ups (Callan, 2001; Mustar, 1997; Smith and Ho, 2006). On 
average, 40% to 50% of the firms in a given market survive beyond the seventh year 
(Eurostat/OECD, 2007), whereas in the case of research-based spin-offs the survival rate 
can be as high as 90% (Smith and Ho, 2006). 
Empirical evidence on the survival of RBSOs is still very limited. Whereas some studies 
have explored the topic, using cross-section data or case studies, so far, only Nerkar and 
Shane (2003) investigated the topic using duration analysis. Their data included 128 spin-
offs from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology founded between 1980 and 1996. 
They found that having a radical technology and broad scope patents in a fragmented 
industry reduces RBSO´s failure. 
Based on a unique self-collected database of the population of research-based spin-offs 
created in Portugal from 1979 up to 2007, we analyse if founding conditions, parent 
organisation characteristics and location characteristics play a role on their survival.  
Our results suggest that start-up size is the founding condition that matters most to 
determine RBSOs´ survival, showing that the larger the start-up size the lower the 
probability of exit by the firm. A similar result is obtained for the role of age: the older the 
spin-off the lower the likelihood of it exiting the market, which is in line with most survival 
studies.  
Regarding the parent organisation characteristics, intellectual eminence or reputation and 
size seem to exert an important effect on spin-off survival. But, contrary to previous 
 4 
 
studies, we do not find that the incubation process, or the presence of social ties with the 
parent organisation have an impact on spin-off survival. 
Concerning the location characteristics, being located in a metropolitan area and in 
municipalities with higher density of firms in high-technology industries and with high 
entry rates seem to be important factors influencing the survival of spin-offs, corroborating 
the widely accepted view of the importance of local spillovers and agglomeration 
externalities in determining firms´ survival. As such, there seems to be no difference 
between RBSOs and other start-ups regarding the region´s role on survival. 
 
2.3. The commercialisation decisions of research-based spin-offs: targeting the 
market for technologies 
Research-based spin-off firms are, by definition, firms set-up to exploit scientific and 
technological knowledge developed in academic research (Mustar et al., 2006). In order to 
pursue with this goal, the new firm has to make a key strategic choice regarding the mode 
of capturing value from its knowledge assets: it may sell/license the actual technology, or 
engage in the development of products or services based on it. The decision on how to 
transform knowledge in economic value also corresponds to a strategic decision on the 
type of market to target: firms can opt for trading in the market for technologies, or chose 
to trade in the market for products (Arora et al., 2001). 
This paper addresses the commercialisation decisions of RBSOs, focusing on the case of 
companies specialising in the production and sale of intellectual property – a model of 
entrepreneurial behaviour increasingly frequent in science-based fields and that research-
based spin-offs may be more prone to adopt, given their specific characteristics.  
We discuss the conditions that can influence firms’ ability to operate in the market for 
technology, and advance some theory-driven hypotheses regarding key factors that are 
likely to determine it – nature of knowledge being exploited, appropriability conditions, 
location and degree of control upon complementary assets and institutional setting of 
origin – as well as their impact upon firms’ decisions. These hypotheses are tested on a 
group of 80 European RBSOs, using data collected specifically for this purpose, on the 
basis of questionnaire-based interviews. 
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Our results suggests that firms willing to operate in these markets should pay particular 
attention to the following aspects: (i) the presence of stringent requirements in what 
concerns both the novelty of the technology being commercialised and the capacity to 
protect it since start-up, a key role being played in such protection by patents filed by the 
parent research organisation; (ii) the situation in terms of access to downstream 
competences and resources that are necessary to capture the value of the technology, in 
particular the extent to which incumbent companies control those assets; (iii) the set of 
competences possessed by the founding team, where a combination of high scientific 
competence (given the nature of knowledge requirements) and critical non-technological 
competences and networks (given the complex requirements of intellectual property trade) 
often emerges as a requisite. The research also calls the attention to the impact of early 
decisions, which can constrain firms’ subsequent behaviour by reducing the margin for 
future choices.  
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II. Entry by research-based spin-offs1 
 
Abstract 
Reflecting the increasing number of research based spin-offs (RBSOs) created since the 
nineties, previous studies focus their analysis on the factors that influence university 
entrepreneurship. However, empirical studies that investigate the determinants of variation 
on RBSO creation across regions are scarce. Using a unique self-collected dataset that 
comprehends the population of RBSOs created in Portugal from 1979 until to 2007 we 
investigate the intensity of spin-offs creation across regions, by focusing on the 
characteristics of the universities and the region in which in the spin-off is located. Our 
results suggest that quality and prestige of the universities located in a municipality, as well 
as the presence of university-affiliated incubators and/or university research parks have a 
positive impact on the intensity of RBSO creation. Regarding the regional characteristics, 
the availability of qualified human capital and the regional demand size seem to exert an 
important effect on the spin-off activity across regions. 
 
1. Introduction 
The commercialisation of scientific and technological knowledge produced in public 
research organisations (PROs) such as universities, laboratories and research centres is 
considered by policy makers to have a fundamental role to play in wealth creation and 
regional economic growth (Ndonzuau et al., 2002; Mustar el al., 2008; Wright et al., 2007). 
In addition to the traditional licensing of innovations, special attention has been given to 
the role played by the creation of new firms that further develop and/or take to the market 
technology and knowledge generated by PROs – the so-called academic or research-based 
spin-offs - RBSOs (Bathelt et al., 2010; Djokovic and Souitaris, 2008; Mustar et al., 2006; 
Rothaermel el al., 2007). 
RBSOs have become an important subject of study due to both their crucial role as  
technology transfer mechanisms and their economic impact, not only to the parent 
                                                             
1
Support provided by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology under the grant SFRH/BD/43222/2008 is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
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university but also to regional and national economic development (Fini et al., 2011; Mustar 
et al., 2006; O´Shea et al., 2008; Wright et al., 2007). In fact, according to the Association 
of University Technology Managers (AUTM 2001), between 1980 and 1999, RBSOs from 
American academic institutions have contributed 280,000 jobs to the US economy and 
$33.5 billion in economic value-added activity (Shane, 2004).  
In the case of Europe, the “spin-off phenomenon” takes place mainly from the late 1990s, 
when we see an increase in the creation of spin-offs from universities and public research 
organisations (van Looy et al., 2011; Wright et al., 2007). This European trend reflects the 
adoption, by several European countries (including Portugal), of regulatory frameworks 
that define the conditions and terms under which universities can maximize the value of 
their knowledge/research through the regulation of intellectual property rights, similar to 
what occurred in the U.S. with the Bayh-Dole Act (OECD, 2003; van Looy et al., 2011). 
The consolidation of the entrepreneurial mission of universities in Europe is directly 
related to the increase of institutional pressure on universities to commercialize research 
through licensing and/or RBSO, with the professionalization of TTOs at the universities 
and the availability of public funds to support entrepreneurial activities  (Claryssse et al., 
2011; Mustar et al., 2008; Wright et al., 2007). 
Given the increase of spin-off activity, the analysis of the determinants for the creation of 
the RBSOs became one of the major research streams on university entrepreneurship. In 
the literature concerning entrepreneurial activity, several factors are pointed out as relevant 
to the creation of spin-offs (Asterbo and Bazzazian, 2011; Djokovic and Souitaris, 2008; 
Gilsing et al., 2010; O´Shea et al., 2008; Rothaermel el al., 2007).  
Considering the different levels of spin-off activity, the following factors are highlighted : 
(1) the founder’s personal characteristics, namely motivation, career experience and faculty 
networking (Clarysse et al., 2011; Karlsson and Wigren, 2012; Landry et al., 2006); (2) the 
universities’ characteristics such as faculty quality and high quality of research (Di Gregorio 
and Shane, 2003; van Looy et al., 2011; Wright et al., 2008); (3) the broader social context 
of the university resources, i.e. entrepreneurial orientation/climate that support 
commercialization activity, namely technology transfer infrastructure- TTO and incubators 
(Lockett and Wright, 2005; O´Shea et al., 2005; Powers and McDougall, 2005); (4) the 
nature and type of technology, namely their pervasiveness, novelty and intellectual property 
protection (Conceição et al., 2012; Gilsing et al., 2010; Shane, 2001); and (5) the external 
characteristics such as regional infrastructure that impact on spin-off activity such as the 
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venture capital availability, the knowledge infrastructure in the region and industry 
structures (Audretsch et al., 2005; Stam, 2010; Woodward et al., 2006). 
In this paper we will address this issue from a regional perspective, investigating the 
determinants of the variation in RBSO creation across regions. Using an unique self-
collected set of data, we analyzed the impact of factors related to the characteristics of the 
existing universities in the region – as a source of knowledge spillovers and supplier of 
resources – as well as other regional characteristics, in the intensity of RBSO creation in a 
given region.  
This issue is rarely addressed in the empirical literature. In most empirical studies carried 
out, research is conducted primarily in the perspective of the parent organization, i.e. the 
determinants of variation in spin-off creation across universities are analyzed as a measure 
of success of its marketing strategy of technological knowledge (e.g. Algieri et al., 2013; 
Avnimelech and Feldman, 2011; Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Landry et al., 2006; O´Shea 
et al., 2005). But studies that analyze the determinants of variation in spin-off creation 
across regions are scarce (Buenstorf and Geissler, 2011; Egeln et al., 2004; Heblich and 
Slavtchev, 2013).  
Buenstorf and Geissler (2011) conclude that the geography of a high-technology industry - 
the laser industry - was shaped by the local availability of potential entrants and 
urbanization economies, in particular research spin-offs, rather than by localization 
economies. Egeln et al. (2004) conclude that the regional demand is the most important 
determinant of spin-offs’ location decision. In their study, they find that a significant 
fraction of public research spin-offs locate rather distant to their parent institution, in order 
to facilitate cooperation with clients or other partners. These authors assess the impact of 
regional factors in spin-offs’ location decisions, but they do not include the characteristics 
of the universities installed in the region in their analysis. They only take in consideration 
the availability of qualified human capital (namely graduates).  
However, Heblich and Slavtchev (2013) investigate the importance of universities in the 
location of academic start-ups. They find that only the parent university influences 
academic entrepreneurs’ decisions to stay in the region, while other universities in the same 
region play no role. However, they do not consider the impact of more generic regional 
characteristics in their analysis; they simply include regional dummies in their model.  
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This study goes beyond prior research by considering both the impact of the characteristics 
of the universities and the region in the location decision and combining them in the 
analysis of the intensity of research spin-off creation across regions. 
Moreover, this study uses a larger and more comprehensive dataset than previous ones, 
which corresponds to the population of Portuguese academic spin-offs created between 
1979 and 2007. 
In the following section we review the extant literature on determinants of spin-off 
creation and put forward a number of hypotheses to be tested. In Section 3 we describe the 
data collection and provide a brief characterization of the population of spin-off firms 
created in Portugal. In Section 4 we describe the methodology and empirical model. The 
results are discussed in Section 5. Finally in Section 6 we conclude and consider some 
policy implications.   
2. Determinants in RBSO creation 
RBSO, given their technology and academic basis, combine both the traditional problems 
associated with the start-up of a new business and the difficulties associated with the 
development and commercialization of new technologies (Oakey et al., 1996; Vohora et al, 
2004). In the process of RBSO creation, access to key resources is crucial, namely technical 
knowledge, specialized human capital, financial resources, physical assets, e.g. laboratories, 
and organizational support (Knockaert et al., 2010; Lockett and Wright, 2005; Mustar et al., 
2006; Wright et al., 2012). Thus the presence of these resources becomes decisive in the 
location of the new company. Egeln et al. (2004) describe the spin-off decision of where to 
locate in order to succeed in the actual creation of the company as an optimization 
problem. 
The literature emphasizes that, in the specific case of RBSOs, the location depends on the 
assessment made of traditional regional mechanisms i.e. if the regions in which the new 
spin-offs operate provide these resources; but it also depends on the existence of university 
level support mechanisms. In fact the resources made available by universities can be 
complementary or even substitutes for resources at local level, in particular access to 
academic incubators, university venture funds and specialized human capital through their 
students and graduates (Fini et al., 2011).  
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Several studies mention that the RBSO tend to be clustered around the parent institution as 
a firm strategy to access knowledge spillovers (Asterbo and Bazzazian, 2011; Egeln et al., 
2004; Shane, 2004). Several authors suggest that being in the vicinity of a university 
provides important cost advantages. In particular, the spatial proximity to the university 
facilitates research collaboration and favors the flow of tacit knowledge. In addition, by 
keeping a formal relation with their parent university, spin-offs can minimize investment in 
fixed capital as they can make use of the infrastructures of the parent as well as its 
reputation/credibility. On the other hand, by staying in the parent region, it will be easier 
for the spin-off founders to mobilize their capital stock which may be a crucial source for a 
successful start of a new firm (Audretsch and Stephan, 1996; Druilhe and Garnsey, 2003; 
Fontes, 2005; Heblich and Slavtchev, 2013; Lejpras and Stephan, 2011; Zucker et al., 1998). 
In fact, it has been observed that the number and characteristics of the universities in the 
region leads to an increase in the number of spin-offs created, highlighting the role of 
universities as anchors of regional development (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; 2004; 
Casper, 2013). 
Regarding the characteristics of universities, several empirical studies demonstrate the 
positive impact of University’s reputation and prestige on the number of spin-offs created 
(Avnimelech and Feldman, 2011; Link and Scott, 2005; O´Shea et al., 2005; Powers and 
McDougall, 2005; Wright et al., 2008). Di Gregorio and Shane (2003) using a sample of the 
start-up activity of 101 U.S. universities demonstrate a positive relation between spin-off 
creation and intellectual eminence/faculty quality. According to van Looy et al. (2011) the 
academics from top universities may have easier access to resources for spin-off creation 
due to reputation effects. Colombo et al. (2010) also considers that the characteristics of 
the local universities, such as the size of the university research staff and the quality of 
university research, influence RBSO’s growth potential. The results show that the 
university’s reputation and prestige as well as the university’s policies toward technology 
transfer, in particular policies for making equity investments and maintaining a low 
investor´s share of royalties, increase the creation of new firms. 
Considering the disciplinary area of research, O´Shea et al. (2005) conclude that a strong 
science and engineering funding base with an orientation in life science, chemistry and 
computer science disciplines have a positive impact on the number of spinoff companies 
generated by a university. According to Audrestch et al. (2004) location is more important 
in the natural sciences, reflecting the specialized nature of scientific knowledge.  
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With regard to the broader social context of the university resources this factor includes 
both institutional norms that maximize an entrepreneurial culture in the academic context2, 
and mechanisms and infrastructures that support the technology transfer and 
commercialization activity. The literature emphasizes that the university policies toward 
technology transfer are decisive to increase the creation new firms (Di Gregorio and Shane, 
2003; Friedman and Silberman, 2003; Lockett and Wright, 2005; Lockett et al., 2003; 
O´Shea et al., 2005). These policies include equity investments, royalty regime of the 
university, funding, expenditure on intellectual property protection, specialized 
competences to support technology transfer and entrepreneurship and infrastructures such 
as incubators and science parks. 
In fact the existence of a technology transfer office (TTOs) and the quality of its staff is 
considered crucial in the process of creating a RBSO3. Several studies highlight that the 
number of spin-offs created is positively influenced by the experience/age of the TTOs, 
the previous success in technology transfer, the financial resources and the full-time 
specialized employees in the TTO (Algieri et al., 2013; Belenzon and Schankerman, 2009; 
O´Shea et al., 2005; Powers and McDougall, 2005).  
The universities’ support to technology transfer is also reflected in the existence of 
infrastructures such as university-affiliated incubator and university research parks; these 
commercial resources are considered essential in the process of RBSO creation (O´Shea et 
al., 2005). 
The business development capabilities of the TTOs and incubators make it possible to 
support spin-offs in these early stages both in terms of opportunity recognition and in 
defining the suitable business model, thus minimizing the frequent lack of business 
competences of academic entrepreneurs and enhancing the success of the spin-off 
(Clarysse and Moray, 2004; Heirman and Clarysse, 2004; Lockett and Wright, 2005; Mustar 
et al., 2006; Vohora et al., 2004). 
The literature concludes that the creation of spin-offs often takes place in the context of an 
incubator, and that they are often inserted into a university-affiliated incubator during the 
initial development stages. This incubation allows support of spin-offs not only in terms of 
                                                             
2 In Portugal, the policies to support technology transfer, in particular stakeholder policies, % for investors, intellectual property rights 
(IPR) are similar for all universities. These will not be taken into account in our analysis because we only consider factors that may affect 
difference in RBSO creation across regions.  
3 All universities in Portugal have a TTO; thus the impact of the existence of the TTO in the creation of RBSO will be measured by the 
existence of the university itself. 
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strategic management and business orientation, access to knowledge that is essential for 
completing the development of technologies or products but also support of physical 
facilities, particularly access to laboratories and administrative staff (Colombo and 
Delmastro, 2002; Lofsten and Lindelof, 2005; Mian, 1996; Wright et al., 2007). According 
to Salvador (2011), who analyzed the relationship between RBSOs and science 
parks/incubators, the main advantages perceived by the firms interviewed, concern the 
access to managerial competence (33%); the availability of a variety of services (43%) as 
well as a lower rent (20%). In addition, 17% of the firms also pointed-out the increased 
visibility as an advantage. In this regard, the author stresses the importance of location in 
the science park or incubator as a mechanism of reputation, similar to the one offered by 
the parent research organization. 
In the specific case of science parks, Link and Scott (2005) consider that the creation of 
RBSO included in science parks is positively influenced by the research park characteristics, 
such as the age of the park, the geographical proximity of the research park to the 
university and by the sector/area in which the park specializes (in cases where it is the same 
as the company’s e.g. biotechnology focus).  
In view of this evidence, we argue that the universities’ characteristics matter to the 
intensity of RBSO creation in a given region and we advance the following hypotheses: 
H1a: RBSOs are more likely to be created if located in a municipality with a high number of universities;  
H1b: RBSOs are more likely to be created if located in a municipality with quality/prestige universities; 
H1c: RBSOs are more likely to be created if located in a municipality with universities that have a strong 
science and engineering funding base; 
H1d: RBSOs are more likely to be created if located in a municipality with research parks and/or 
incubators; 
Although the assessment of opportunities of access to spillovers and other advantages 
derived from locating in the vicinity of universities is a key element in decision-making 
about location, the RBSOs created must still assess the regional characteristics, i.e. the 
resources available in a given region. 
The joint consideration of the conditions found in the university and at regional level may 
lead to the RBSO deciding to locate in a region distinct from its parent. This happens when 
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the spin-offs feel the need to cooperate in technology development with other knowledge 
besides their parent organization and when they need to access the scarce resources in that 
region such as highly qualified labor or supplier networks (Egeln et al. 2004). On the other 
hand, the spin-off may decide to stay in the region of its parent organization for reasons 
not related to the parent, as for example the fact that entrepreneurs reside in that region 
and its social networks that allow access to resources needed for creating the company 
(Casper, 2013; Fontes, 2005; Stam, 2010). 
In this sense, several studies show that different factors associated to regional 
characteristics are also considered crucial for the location of the new knowledge and high-
technology firms (Audretsch and Feldman, 2004; Audretsch et al., 2005; Baptista and 
Mendonça, 2010; Buenstorf and Geissler, 2011; Woodward et al., 2006). Interregional 
characteristics assume a leading role in the location of RBSOs at the time of their creation. 
For the knowledge-based and high-technology firms one of the relevant regional factors in 
location decision are the agglomeration or external economies i.e. positive externalities 
resulting from co-location. Several studies refer that the local high density of high-
technology firms attracts companies to that research intensive region, allowing them access 
to knowledge spillovers4 (Armington and Acs, 2002; Audretsch et al., 2005; Friedman and 
Silberman, 2003; Lach and Schankerman, 2008).  
On the other hand, several studies highlight the importance of the location of these 
knowledge-based firms, the availability of venture capital financing in the region and 
qualified human capital. Access to financial assets is crucial to the creation of spin-offs, 
particularly the availability of venture capital availability due to its greater propensity to 
finance start-ups with high risk5 (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Landry et al., 2006; Powers 
and Mc Dougall, 2005). With regard to human capital, the literature shows that regions that 
have a high level of employees with higher educational levels are related to higher levels of 
start-up activity (Armington and Acs, 2002; Figueiredo et al., 2002). In the specific case of 
knowledge-based firms access to specialized and qualified labor is indeed an essential 
re4source so its existence directly influences the location decision (Audretsch et al., 2005; 
Evila et al., 2011¸ Kim et al., 2012; Woodward et al., 2006). 
                                                             
4 The literature presents several case studies regarding the dynamics of the technical and industrial clusters, in particular the cooperation 
among local firms involving several small and medium-sized enterprises (SMESs) and larger technology companies. See for example: 
Feldman (2003), Harrison et al. (2004) and Saxexian (1994). 
5 In Portugal the public funding policies are not regional but at national level. Similarly, the VC that invest in RBSO are nationwide. 
Therefore, the financial resources at national level do not determine the location at regional level, and so are not considered in our 
analysis - we only consider factors that may affect differences in RBSO creation across regions. 
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Another feature of the region considered relevant in the choice of location for these 
companies is the regional demand size. In fact, the bigger the market the bigger the 
“power” to attract start-ups should be (Baptista and Mendonça, 2010). This suggests that 
urban areas can be particularly favorable locations, given the high population density and 
thus the relative ease of access to customers (consumer demand) (Buenstorf and Geissler, 
2011; Stam, 2010). Urban areas are also more likely to offer the inputs required for the 
firm’s operation: capital, labor, suppliers.   
The literature confirms this idea. According to Figueiredo et al. (2002) the regional 
concentration of companies is also explained by the need of start-ups to be located in 
metropolitan areas and urban centers that are characterized by high resources, 
concentration of institutions of higher education, technological research facilities and a 
wide range of market opportunities. Subsequent studies confirm that this proximity to 
urban centers is a crucial factor for the science-based firms (Baptista and Mendonça, 2010; 
van Geenhuizen, 2008; Woodward et al., 2006).  
Therefore, considering that regional characteristics do matter with regard to the intensity of 
RBSO creation in a given region, we suggest the following hypotheses: 
H2a: RBSOs are more likely to be created if located in a municipality with a high level of agglomeration 
externalities;  
H2b: RBSOs are more likely to be created if located in a municipality with a high level of human capital 
available; 
H2c: RBSOs are more likely to be created if located in a municipality with a high level of demand size;  
H2d: RBSOs are more likely to be created if located in a municipality near the major urban areas. 
3. Creation of RBSOs in Portugal 
This study uses the population of Portuguese RBSOs created between 1979 and 2007. In 
order to identify this population we started by collecting publicly available information on 
the spin-outs from universities and other public research organisations. In the case of 
organisations that did not have that information available, or where only the more recent 
spin-offs were listed, we contacted the university and/or its TTOs or incubators, asking for 
the required data. This was a lengthy process, but it proved to be important, because it 
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enabled us to identify all the spin-off firms created (to the best of our knowledge) and to 
check the data available on them. 
The next step was to confirm whether all the spin-offs identified had been through the 
process of legal constitution and when this had exactly taken place. This was because spin-
off firms tend to make their legal registration only when they actually have prospects of 
business or commercialization of the technology (EC, 2003). For this purpose we resorted 
to the Institute of Registration and Notary Affairs (IRN – Ministry of Justice) database.  
As a result of this search we ended-up identifying a total of 327 spin-off research firms 
legally set up until the end of 2007. For all these firms, we collected information on the 
year of creation, location, sector of activity, the number of employees on founding date and 
parent organization.   
This gathering of information was carried out by phases. We began by accessing the data 
published by the firms themselves in their annual reports and websites (official pages). For 
more specific information we asked the firms by e-mail and later, when necessary, we 
contacted them by phone.  
The first Portuguese RBSO was created in 1979 (to the best of our knowledge), but the 
formation of spin-off firms in universities and other research organizations only became 
more frequent from the mid 1980’s onwards (Figure 2.1). A closer analysis of the evolution 
of Portuguese RBSO creation over time shows that their numbers started to increase in the 
1990s and continued to grow into the 2000s. Indeed, 39.45% of the firms were created 
between 1990 and 2000 and 54.13% after 2000. This evolution follows the European trend 
and reflects the adoption, by several European countries (including Portugal), of regulatory 
frameworks to promote the entrepreneurial mission of universities (Claryssse et al., 2011; 
Mustar et al., 2008; Wright et al., 2007). Please note that the policies of support for 
technology transfer and innovation may be heterogeneous across European countries 
(Mustar and Wright, 2010). When comparing policies to support RBSO creation in France 
and the UK, the authors concluded that these are different. In UK, policy is at university 
level, leading to the creation of diverse structures. In fact spin-offs are a part of a policy to 
commercialize technology and knowledge created by universities. In France, in contrast, 
the emphasis is on the development of high technology new ventures as part of a 
technological entrepreneurship policy.  
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In Portugal, there are four types of public measures which are relevant to foster university 
spin-off creation, although most of them are not specifically oriented to spin-offs: 
Incentives to university knowledge transfer; promotion of New Technology-Based Firms 
(NTBF); promotion of venture capital investments; and simplification of the firm’s 
relationship with the Public Administration. The first relevant public interventions in this 
domain began in the 1980s, but it was especially after 2000, along with a growing focus on 
the economic usefulness of PROs research activities and an increasing emphasis on the 
valorization of public R&D results, that specific measures to support academic 
entrepreneurship became more widespread. In fact, although there is a variety of generic 
programs supporting the creation of entrepreneurial/innovative firms (to which academic 
entrepreneurs can also resort), a number of funding organizations have more recently 
started to promote entrepreneurial programs/competitions that specifically target the 
commercialization of research originating from the university.  Institutional initiatives from 
higher education institutions in this area have also been increasing, particularly through 
their association to science parks and incubators and the promotion of entrepreneurship 
competitions and/or training programs. Frequently, these institutional initiatives are 
supported by private institutions, such as banks, trade associations or firms (Fontes et al., 
2009). 
 
Ilustração 1 Figure 2.1- Number of Portuguese RBSOs by founding date (1979-2007) (n=327) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Regarding the sectorial distribution of the RBSOs, the software and multimedia services 
sector represent 40.67% of the population with 133 RBSOs, followed by the biotechnology 
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and biochemistry with 64 firms (19.57%). The smaller proportion corresponds to 
engineering and materials with 19 RBSOs (5.81%) (Figure 2.2)  
 
Ilustração 2 Figure 2.2  – Number of Portuguese RBSO by sector 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
The vast majority of the RBSOs (78.9%) originate from the seven largest and most 
prestigious Portuguese public universities6, or from research organizations associated to 
them. The remaining RBSOs originate from other public universities and public research 
laboratories, although there are also some private universities and a couple of polytechnic 
institutions among the parent organizations (Figure 2.3). This is in line with the literature; 
in fact the spin-offs tend to originate in a small number from eminent universities. The 
world-class large scientific universities and prestige public research organizations which are 
focused on a specific sector tend to generate more RBSOs than the “small” universities 
without a strong research specialty (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Mustar el al., 2008; 
Rasmussen and Borch, 2010).  
                                                             
6 These seven universities represent the only Portuguese universities included in the Top 500 academic rating score of universities 
published in the Webometrics Ranking of World Universities. 
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Ilustração 3 Figure 2.3  – Number of Portuguese RBSO by parent organization 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
3.1 Location standards of the RBSOs created 
Concerning the location, Portuguese RBSO firms tend to be located in the main cities or in 
their metropolitan areas. The Portuguese mainland is divided into eighteen districts7 and 
308 municipalities; in fact we only recorded RBSO creation in just 53 municipalities. It 
should be noted that over the period observed only 27 spin-offs (8.26%) changed their 
starting location.  
As can be seen in Figure 2.4 the RBSOs created are mostly concentrated in the largest cities 
of the coast and spin-off creation in municipalities of the interior of the country is residual. 
In fact, all of the spin-offs created, 52%, are located in municipalities belonging to the 
districts of Lisbon and Porto (30.28% and 21.71%, respectively) followed by the districts of 
Coimbra (15.29%), Braga (11.62%) and Aveiro (5.81%) (see also Table 2.1). 
In Portugal, 79% of RBSOs, i.e. 258 firms, are located less than 25 km from parent, which 
is in line with the cluster pattern of the spin-offs. In 2000, AUTM reported that 80% 
percent of firms formed from university licenses operated in the state where the university 
was located. This number dropped to a total of 72 % in 2007 (AUTM, 2001, 2008). Shane 
(2004) analyzing a sample of 72 MIT spin-offs between 1980 and 1996, revealed that 50% 
are located within 20 km of MIT and over 70% are located less than 100 km from MIT. 
                                                             
7 District is a higher administrative region, which is composed by several adjacent municipalities (concelhos).  
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Asterbo and Bazzazian (2011) discovered that a dominant fraction of spin-offs are located 
very close to their parent, within 50 km. 
Of these 100 companies, 38.76% were actually located in the parent’s premises on the date 
of creation (0 km distance). And 77% of Portuguese spin-offs (i.e. 253 firms) were 
effectively integrated in a university-affiliated incubator on the date of creation.  
 
Ilustração 4 Figure 2.4 – Spatial distribution of Portuguese RBSO per municipalities (1979 – 
2007) 
 
Note: Each dot = 1 spin-off firm. Source: Own calculations. 
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Tabel a 1 Table 2.1 – Distribution of Portuguese RBSO 
Districts RBSO  Number RBSO  Percentage 
Aveiro  19 05.81 
Braga 38 11.62 
Coimbra 50 15.29 
Lisboa  99 30.28 
Porto  71 21.71 
Others1 50 15.29 
Total 327 100 
1 Others relate to 8 Districts with less than 10 spin-offs firms. Source: Own calculations. 
Considering the districts with the largest number of spin-offs created, the sectorial 
distribution is quite similar (Figure 2.5). In the districts of Lisbon and Porto most 
companies focus on two sectors: software and multimedia activities (41% and 39%, 
respectively) and biotechnology and biochemistry (22% and 21%, respectively). For the 
remaining sectors it turns out that in the district of Porto these are distributed evenly 
(about 10% each). In the case of the district of Lisbon note the residual value of the sector 
of energy and environment (representing 0.3%).   
The “leadership” trend of the software and multimedia sector remains in the districts of 
Coimbra, Braga and Aveiro (48%, 47% and 32% respectively). In the district of Braga 
second place goes to the electronics and instrumentation sector with 21% while in the 
districts of Coimbra and Aveiro the remaining sectors have very similar values (about 
15%), with the exception of the energy and environment sector, with little or no weight 
(0% and 0.5% respectively). Among the districts with the lowest number of companies, the 
weight of the biotechnology and biochemistry sector in the district of Faro (45%) stands 
out.  
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Ilustração 5 Figure 2.5 - Portuguese RBSO distribution by sector and district 
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4. Empirical Analysis  
4.1. Data and empirical model  
Data 
After the various stages of our data collection of population of Portuguese RBSOs, 
described in section 3, we identified a total of 327 spin-off research firms legally set up 
until the end of 2007.  
Each RBSO created was assigned to the respective Portuguese municipality (concelho). The 
information concerning the characteristics of the universities and the characteristics of the 
region were also collected in terms of municipalities - our regional unit of analysis.  
As mentioned in section 3 (Figure 4) the creation of RBSOs in Portugal is concentrated in 
just 53 municipalities. In fact, over these 13 years we noted 255 municipalities where RBSO 
creation never occurred. Since the object of this paper is to analyze the determinants of the 
intensity of creating RBSOs in a given location and considering the specifics of this event, 
we will restrict our analysis to the municipalities where the event under analysis actually 
took place.    
Data regarding the municipalities was collected from the “Quadros de Pessoal” database, 
which results from information gathered yearly by the Portuguese Ministry of Social 
Security and Labor, for the period 1986 to 2009, on the basis of mandatory information 
submitted by firms. Additional data related to population density and the distances between 
municipalities were collected at the National Institute of Statistics (INE). Regarding the 
public and private research organizations the data was collected from the Ministry of 
Science and Higher Education (MCTES) and from the Webometrics Ranking of World 
Universities. 
For our analysis we will only consider the RBSO created in mainland Portugal between 
1995 and 2009, in a total of 261 firms. This is due to data constraints regarding the 
universities, which is only available from 1994 onwards. It should be noted that the 
evolution of spin-off research firms in Portugal occurred predominantly in the mid-
nineties, as in the remaining Europe (EC, 2003). This sample keeps the pattern of cluster 
location identified in the population; in fact 78.54% of the spin-offs created between 1995 
and 2009 are located less than 25 km from the parent.  
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Empirical model 
Our aim is to investigate the intensity of spin-offs that are created across regions, by 
focusing on the characteristics of the university and the region in which in the spin-off is 
located. Thus, our reduced form model is: 
                   (1) 
where, RBSOjt denotes the entry of spin-off firms in region i at time period t, Uit is a vector 
of university characteristics, and Rit, is a vector of region-specific characteristics that vary 
across region and time. 
The dependent variable used is a count of the number of RBSO created in each year in 
each region (municipality). The preponderance of zeros, the small values and discrete 
nature of the dependent variable (Table 2.2) suggest that we could improve the linear 
model with a specification that accounts for these characteristics (Cameron and Trivedi, 
1998; Faria et al., 2003).  
 
Tabel a 2 Table 2.2 - RBSO Creation: frequency distributions. 
Notes: N = 261 firms; 585 municipality-year spells, i.e., 45 municipalities*13 years 
In order to test our hypotheses we use as predictors variables the measures for universities’ 
characteristics and regional characteristics at municipality level. The respective descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table 2.3. 
Regarding the universities’ characteristics we included in our regression the variables 
Universities Number, Top Universities, Tech Universities and Incubators.  
Concerning the existence of universities and their intensity in the region, we included the 
variable Universities Number; which is the number of private and public higher education 
Count 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Mean Variance 
Frequency 444 83 28 15 5 4 5 1  0.446 1.066 
Relative 
frequency 
0.759 0.142 0.048 0.026 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.002  
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institutions per municipality (Baptista and Mendonça (2010). For Top Universities we 
examined the overall academic rating score of universities published in the Webometrics 
Ranking of World Universities and we built a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is at least 
one university among the Top 500 located in the municipality, and zero otherwise. In 
Portugal these are Nova University of Lisbon, Technical University of Lisbon, University 
of Aveiro, University of Coimbra, University of Lisbon, University of Minho and 
University of Porto.  
Concerning the disciplinary research area of the universities, we include in Tech Universities a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if there are, in the municipality, universities with 
technological focus, and zero otherwise.  
Regarding the commercial orientation of universities we include in Incubators a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if there are, in the municipality, infrastructures to support technology 
transfer and entrepreneurship such as incubators and/or science parks, and zero otherwise. 
The identification and location of science parks was made according to TecParques- 
Portuguese Association of Science and Technology Parks. 
Concerning the characteristics of the region, to measure the agglomeration economies we 
included the variable High-tech, which controls the potential for spillovers and is measured 
by the ratio of the number of firms in high-technology industries by the total number of 
firms per municipality (Baptista and Mendonça 2010). Following Eurostat, high-technology 
industries included high-tech and medium-high manufacturing firms and, also, knowledge 
intensive services (KIS). 
Regarding the availability of Human capital, we took into account the level of qualified 
human capital available in the region, measured by the ratio of the number of employees 
with high school education, or higher, to the total number of employees in the 
municipality.  
We also included a measure for Demand Size; following Baptista and Mendonça (2010), we 
used the logarithm of total population per square meter. 8  
Finally in order to measure the urban accessibility, we included two variables (Figueiredo et 
al., 2002, Baptista and Mendonça, 2010). For measuring the major urban accessibility, i.e, 
access to largest markets, we considered the distances in kilometers (km) to the two major 
                                                             
8 Woodward et al. (2006) use the regional population density as a proxy for Land Costs. 
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urban areas of Portugal (Lisbon and Porto). Regarding minor urban accessibility, i.e., access to 
regional markets, we measured the distance in km from each municipality to the 
corresponding district’s administrative center. 
As additional controls we included the covariate Years dummies to account for annual 
variations in spin-off activity. We also included Regional dummies in order to control 
regional differences, namely dummies for the Districts (Lisbon, Porto and others) and 
additional dummies for the nut 2 regions (Baptista and Mendonça, 2010). 
In Table 2.4 we present the correlation matrix. Correlation analysis indicates medium to 
low levels of correlations. The highest correlation was between the Universities Number and 
Top Universities (0.62), suggesting that multi-collinearity was absent. 
 
Tabel a 3 Table 2.3 - Descriptive statistics of predictor variables. 
Variable % Min Max Mean S.D. 
Universities Number   0 38 2.28 5.63 
Top Universities 13.33    0.34 
Universities Tech  53.33    0.50 
Incubators 31.11    0.46 
High-tech (ln)  -6.93 -1.85 -4.51 2.22 
Human capital (ln)  -5.04 -1.39 -2.84 0.60 
Population density (ln)  2.20 8.91 5.90 1.50 
Distance to administrative center   0 127 26.67 27.66 
Distance to Porto  0 564 215.28 175.50 
Distance to Lisboa  0 399 214.58 118.64 
Notes: All variables are defined at municipality level unless otherwise stated. 
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Tabel a 4 Table 2.4 - Correlations for the dependent variable and predictor variables. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 RBSOs creation           
 Universities Number 0.56***          
 Top Universities  0.54*** 0.62***         
 Universities Tech  0.28*** .035*** 0.37***        
 Incubators 0.43*** 0.38*** 0.58*** 0.53***       
 High-tech 0.05 0.04 0.07* 0.18*** 0.07*      
 Human capital  0.41*** 0.41*** 0.36*** 0.25*** 0.35*** 0.29***     
 Population density  0.35*** 0.47*** 0.38*** 0.35*** 0.22*** 0.38*** 0.39***    
 Distance to 
administrative center  
-0.25*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.37*** -0.33*** -0.30*** -0.33*** -0.39*** 
 
 
 Distance to Porto -0.09** -0.03 -0.15*** -0.23*** -0.08** -0.20*** 0.08** -0.36*** 0.21***  
 Distance to Lisboa -0.09** -0.22*** -0.07 0.04 0.07* 0.03 -0.27*** 0.02 -0.23*** -0.49*** 
Note: **, * means significant at 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
4.2. Method 
Given the discrete nature of our data, i.e., the number of spin-off firms created in a given 
region, we employed count data regression analysis. 
The starting point for count data regression is the Poisson model (Hausman et al., 1984), 
where the univariate Poisson distribution for the number of occurrences of the event y 
over a fixed exposure period has the probability function 
          
        
   
 ,            y = 0, 1, 2, …. (2) 
where μ is the shape parameter which indicates the average number of events in the given 
time interval. The Poisson distribution assumes that the mean and the variance of the 
process are equal 
                      (3) 
This equidispersion assumption is violated when overdispersion (underdispersion) of the data is 
observed, i.e, the variance exceeds (is less than) the mean. Among the reasons that may 
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lead to the violation of this assumption are the unobserved heterogeneity and a high 
frequency of zeros in the data (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).   
The negative binomial model (NB) provides a solution for the unobserved heterogeneity by 
incorporating an unobserved specific effect α. The NB probability distribution of Y is 
              
  (     )
                 
   
   
      
  
      
 
     
     …. 
(4) 
where Ґ is the gamma function. The mean of the negative binomial distribution (like the 
Poisson) is μ but the variance is μ (1 + αμ), where α is called the dispersion parameter. The 
NB model is more general than the Poisson model because it accommodates over 
dispersion and it reduces to the Poisson model as α →0.  
Considering longitudinal count data regression models Cameron and Trivedi, (1998) define 
that are standard count models, with the addition of an individual specific term reflecting 
individual heterogeneity.  
For count models for longitudinal data or panel data the Poisson regression model with 
exponential mean function and multiplicative individual specific term    
    ~                  
                                                                        
(5) 
In the random effects model for count data the Poisson random effects model is given by 
(5), that is,     conditional on    and     is idd Poisson (         ) and     is a function 
of      and parameters  .  Different distributions for    lead to different distributions for 
         . 
Hausman et al. (1984) proposed a conjugate-distributed random effects where the gamma 
density is conjugate to the Poisson and additionally considered the negative binomial case. 
The joint density for the     individual in Poisson random-effects model (with gamma –
distributed random effects) is given by 
                [∏
   
   
     
 ]  
 
 ∑          
   ∑          
  ∑        
   ∑          
       
  
(6) 
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where    is idd gamma (δ, δ) so that E [  ] = 1 and V[  ] = 1/ δ 
Regarding the negative binomial random effects model the joint density for the     
individual is given by 
                [∏
             
                     
 ]  
              ∑              ∑       
                     ∑       ∑       
     (7) 
5. Results 
In order to investigate the determinants of the intensity of RBSOs creation across regions 
we employed a count data regression analysis for a span year of 13 periods compiled for 
this study.  
Assuming unobserved heterogeneity is randomly distributed across municipalities we rely 
on a random effect model (Baptista and Mendonça, 2010; Hausman et al., 1984). In fact 
the high variability in the number of spin-offs creation across municipalities excludes a 
fixed effects model. Regarding regional differences we decided to add to the initial model 
(Model 1) regional dummies corresponding to Model 2.  
Concerning count models for longitudinal data we first run Poisson regression models and 
then we compare with negative binomial models. In fact in our data the sample variance is 
higher than the sample mean (see Table 2.2), i.e., the equidispersion Poisson distribution 
assumption is rejected because of overdispersion of dependent variable.  
The likelihood-ratio test on the hypothesis that the overdispersion parameter alpha is equal to 
0 presents a p-value of 0.000 in Model 1 and a p-value of 0.077 in Model 2 and thus we 
find alpha is significantly different from zero and thus reinforces that the Poisson 
distribution is not appropriate to our sample (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). 
Given the presence of considerable overdispersion in our data, the negative binomial model 
should be considered (Table 2.5). 
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Tabel a 5 Table 2.5 - Poisson and negative binomial estimates of the intensity of RBSOs in 
Portuguese regions 
 (1) (2) 
Covariates Poisson 
Negative 
Binomial 
Poisson 
Negative 
Binomial 
Universities Number -0.001 
(0.017) 
-0.001 
(0.017) 
-0.009 
(0.015) 
-0.009 
(0.015) 
Top Universities  0.571* 
(0.306) 
0.577* 
(0.307) 
0.614* 
(0.318) 
0.616* 
(0.320) 
Universities Tech  0.067 
(0.282) 
0.085 
(0.287) 
0.136 
(0.261) 
0.148 
(0.265) 
Incubators 0.908*** 
(0.287) 
0.873*** 
(0.298) 
1.010*** 
(0.268) 
1.000*** 
(0.274) 
High-tech -0.068 
(0.079) 
-0.066 
(0.080) 
-0.070 
(0.071) 
-0.069 
(0.072) 
Human capital  1.100*** 
(0.355) 
1.110*** 
(0.362) 
1.177*** 
(0.422) 
1.169*** 
(0.428) 
Population density  0.164* 
(0.097) 
0.162* 
(0.098) 
-0.030 
(0.167) 
-0.033 
(0.168) 
Distance to administrative center  -0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
Distance to Porto -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
Distance to Lisboa -0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
Dummy for Years YES YES YES YES 
Dummy for Distrito  _____ _____ YES YES 
Dummy for Nut2 _____ _____ YES YES 
Constant 0.118 
(1.505) 
3.022 
(2.056) 
0.298 
(2.598) 
3.259 
(3.057) 
Notes: Number of observations: 585. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * means significant at 
1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
Considering Model 1 and regarding the characteristics of the universities, our results reveal 
that the total number of public and private universities in a municipality (Universities 
Number) has no impact in the intensity of spin-off creation, hence Hypothesis 1a is not 
supported. In fact it seems that it is not the quantity of universities but their quality and 
reputation that positively influence the spin-off creation activity in a given region In fact it 
seems that it is not the quantity of universities but their quality and reputation that 
positively influence the spin-off creation activity in a given region. The existence of 
universities of recognized quality and prestige (Top Universities) has a positive impact on 
spin-off creation, therefore providing support to Hypothesis 1b. This result is in line with 
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previous evidence (e.g. Avnimelech and Feldman, 2011; Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; 
O´Shea et al., 2005; van Looy et al., 2011). 
On the other hand, the existence in the municipality of universities with technological 
focus does not seem to be relevant in determining the intensity of the spin-off creation as 
the coefficient of the dummy variable Universities Tech is not statistically relevant. Hence 
Hypothesis 1c is not supported by the data. 
The presence of university-affiliated incubators and/or university research parks (Incubators) 
in the municipality does seem to be key in explaining the intensity of spin-off creation in 
that location. Results show that the existence of university incubators and/or university 
research parks in the municipality increases the spin-off activity, therefore providing 
support to our Hypothesis 1d. This result is consistent with previous evidence that has 
found a positive role of university infrastructures that support technology transfer and 
commercialization activity of spin-off creation (e.g. Colombo and Delmastro, 2002; Link 
and Scott, 2005; Salvador, 2011; Wright et al., 2007). 
Interestingly, with regard to regional characteristics, we do not observe a significant 
relationship between agglomeration economies and intensity of spin-off creation hence 
Hypothesis 2a is not supported. Indeed, results shows that the density of firms in high-
technology industries (High-tech) have no significant impact on the variation on spin-offs 
creation. This result is in line with the results of Buenstorf and Geissler (2011) in a similar 
study – the authors found no evidence that regions with existing industry agglomerations 
experienced higher rates of academic entrepreneurship.  
Our results show that the availability of qualified human capital in the municipality (Human 
capital) increases significantly the intensity of spin-offs creation, therefore providing support 
to our Hypothesis 2b. Additionally, results also provide support for the positive influence 
of regional demand (Population density) on spin-off activity (Egeln et al., 2004). Spin-offs are 
more likely to be created in municipalities with higher population density and thus relatively 
easier access to customers (Buenstorf and Geissler, 2011; Stam, 2010). Thus, Hypothesis 2c 
is supported. 
Finally, urban accessibility does not seem to have an impact on the intensity of spin-off 
creation. Thus Hypothesis 2d is not supported. This result seems to indicate that for spin-
off firms the transportation cost does not matter for location decision. However, this result 
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should be analyzed with special care because in fact the vast majority of our sample (52% 
in Lisbon and Porto) is actually located in the large Portuguese urban centers. Baptista and 
Mendonça (2010) when analyzing the location of Portuguese knowledge-based start-ups 
also found some “puzzling” results concerning this variable.   
In order to control for other regional differences in the response behavior, we decided to 
include regional dummies (Model 2). When we take into account these regional dummies, 
the estimates are similar with the exception, not surprisingly, of the variable Population 
density which is no longer significant (see Guimarães et al. (2000) for a similar effect). 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
Reflecting the increasing number of research based spin-offs (RBSOs) created since the 
nineties, previous studies focus their analysis on the factors that influence university 
entrepreneurship. However, empirical studies that investigate the determinants of variation 
on RBSO creation across regions are scarce.  
In this paper, using a unique self-collected dataset that includes the population of RBSOs 
created in Portugal from 1979 until to 2007, we approached this topic from a regional 
perspective. More specifically, we investigated the impact of factors related to the 
characteristics of existing universities in the region and of other regional characteristics, on 
the intensity of RBSO creation across regions. 
Our results suggest that the quality and prestige of the universities located in a municipality 
is a crucial factor for the intensity of RBSO creation. In fact the existence of top 
universities has a positive impact on RBSO creation, while the number of universities or 
the existence of universities with technological focus in the municipality do not seem to be 
relevant in discriminating the spin-off activity across regions. On the other hand the results 
show an important effect of the presence of university-affiliated incubators and/or 
university research parks in the municipality on spin-off creation across regions.  
Regarding the regional characteristics, the availability of qualified human capital and the 
regional demand size seem to exert an important effect on the intensity of spin-off 
creation. An interesting result that emerges from our data is the non-significance of the 
impact of proximity to urban centers. The non-significance of this predictor variable 
suggests that transportation cost is not an issue for spin-off location decisions. A possible 
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explanation could be the effective concentration of our sample in urban centers – most 
spin-off firms have distances from Porto or Lisbon close to zero. Another interesting result 
is with regard to the agglomeration economies. In fact the high density of firms on high-
technology industries in a municipality has no impact on variation of spin-off creation 
across regions. As such, there seems to be no differences between RBSOs and other start-
ups regarding the industry agglomerations impact on their location (see Buenstorf and 
Geissler (2011) for a similar result). 
In Portugal, it is clear that the regions with top universities are actually the ones with the 
best regional resources – more qualified human capital available and high population 
density – so it is natural that RBSOs show a high concentration in these regions.  
Our results have several implications from a policy point of view. They point out the 
importance of the quality rather than the quantity of existing universities in the municipality 
in RBSO location, as well as the relevance of the educational level of human capital. 
Similarly, the importance of the existence of infrastructures to support the 
commercialization of technology is emphasized, namely incubators and science parks. All 
these factors point to the need for policies that put a greater focus on the quality of 
Portuguese universities, as well as on policies that support the innovation 
commercialization efforts made by individual universities.  
The main limitation of our data is the impossibility of assessing the specific characteristics 
of the TTO, namely age, experience of staff and dimension of staff. With regard to lines 
for further research, it would be important to explore the role of local R&D capabilities, as 
well as the impact of factors related with individual choices - such as whether founders live 
and work in the region and are reluctant to move – on the location decision of RBSOs. 
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III. Determinants of research-based spin-offs survival9 
 
Abstract 
Existing literature has shown that research-based spin-offs firms usually exhibit lower 
death risks than other start-ups. However, few studies have focused on the survival 
determinants of these particular firms. From a unique self-collected database of the 
population of research-based spin-offs created in Portugal from 1979 up to 2007 we 
analyse if founding conditions, parent organisation characteristics and location 
characteristics play a role on their survival. Our results show that start-up size, firm age, 
parent reputation and region characteristics are key determinants of research-based spin-
offs survival, casting doubts on the role played by the incubation process and the social ties 
with the parent organisation as advanced in previous studies. 
 
1. Introduction 
The entry of new firms in the market bringing in new knowledge, technologies or products 
is seen as an important driver of economic growth (e.g. Shane, 2004; Vincett, 2010). Spin-
off firms are a particular case of new firm entry. Academic or research-based spin-off 
(RBSO) relates to a firm whose creation is based on the formal and informal transfer of 
technology or knowledge generated by public research organisations (Djokovic and 
Souitaris, 2008; Mustar et al., 2006). The study of RBSO has assumed a growing 
importance in the literature reflecting the importance of these firms as a mechanism of 
exploitation and transfer of scientific knowledge produced in research institutions, serving 
also as measure of success of the parent organisation (Wright et al., 2007). 
An empirical regularity emerging from recent evidence is that these firms exhibit lower 
death risks than other entrants in the same industry (Callan, 2001; Mustar, 1997; Smith and 
Ho, 2006). On average, 40% to 50% of the firms in a given market survive beyond the 
seventh year (Eurostat/OECD, 2007), whereas in the case of research-based spin-offs the 
survival rate can be as high as 90% (Smith and Ho, 2006). A possible explanation could be 
that RBSOs benefit from numerous advantages, either in the set up phase or throughout 
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the life of the firm such as the high number of employees with PhD degrees, greater 
experience in research, privileged access to financial funds and networks with the academic 
system (Jong, 2006; Lockett and Wright, 2005; Walter et al., 2006). However, these firms 
usually have on average less experience in industry, which could act as a disadvantage and 
offset those potential advantages (Colombo and Piva, 2012).  
Another explanation could be the innovative capacity of these firms. The degree of 
innovation of the firm and the fact that it is near of the technological frontier is regarded as 
relevant to increase their probability of survival (Audretsch, 1995; Fontana and Nesta, 
2009). However, according to Agarwal (1996) the innovative activity can be both beneficial 
and detrimental to survival. On the one hand new firms have the greatest likelihood of 
survival with radical technologies, on the other hand the high level of uncertainty inherent 
to the innovation process can increase their hazard rate.  
Empirical evidence on the survival of RBSOs is still very limited. Whereas somestudies 
have explored the topic using cross-section data or case studies, only Nerkar and Shane 
(2003) have so far investigated the topic using duration analysis. Their data included 128 
spin-offs from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) founded between 1980 
and 1996. They found that having a radical technology and broad scope patents in a 
fragmented industry reduces the RBSO´s failure. 
Using a unique dataset, this paper analyses the survival of Portuguese RBSOs from its 
beginning in 1979 to 2007. The study goes beyond prior research in using a larger and 
more comprehensive database than previous studies that corresponds to the population of 
Portuguese academic spin-offs. Moreover, this study provides an integrative view by 
simultaneously investigating the role that founding conditions, parent and location 
characteristics play on RBSOs´ survival.  
In the following section we review previous evidence on spin-offs survival and propose the 
hypotheses to be tested. In Section 3 we describe the data collection and characterise spin-
off firms in Portugal. In Section 4 we describe the methodology and empirical model. The 
results are discussed in Section 5. Finally in Section 6 we conclude and consider some 
policy implications.  
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2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Spin-off´s founding conditions 
Industrial economists have shown that founding conditions are important determinants of 
firm’s growth and survival, in particular, founders´ qualifications and the start-up size of 
the firm (Argawal and Audretsch, 2001; Geroski et al., 2010; Gimmon and Levie, 2010; 
Honjo et al., 2013). 
In the case of RBSOs the founding team has also been pointed out as one of the peculiar 
genetic characteristics of these firms (Colombo and Piva, 2012). This is because academic 
spin-offs founding teams usually have a higher number of PhD degrees and greater 
research experience than high-tech start-ups. For instance, Colombo and Piva (2012), based 
on a sample of 64 Italian RBSOs conclude that the initial competences of the 
entrepreneurial team are a key source of competitive advantage, leaving an enduring 
imprint on the firm’s development. 
However this potential advantage may be offset by the fact that most academic 
entrepreneurs have an obvious lack of entrepreneurial skills that can translate into 
difficulties in terms of identifying business opportunities or identification of investors and 
customers (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004; Mustar et al., 2006). This argument is consistent 
with Astebro et al. (2012) who found that a recent graduate is twice as likely as her 
Professor to start a business within three years of graduation, and that the graduates’ spin-
offs are not of low quality. Buenstorf (2007) also found that in the German laser industry 
entrants with different pre-entry backgrounds differ systematically in their longevity, with 
startups from academic backgrounds exiting earlier than diversifiers and spin-offs from 
industry incumbents. Hence employee learning emerges as a primary driving force of 
corporate spin-off process vis-a-vis academic spin-off in the German laser industry. 
Despite this opposite evidence, it is likely to expect that founding teams with PhD may 
have some additional advantage relatively to founding teams who do not have any PhD. 
This maybe because PhD team members are expected to have a deeper knowledge of the 
technology´s characteristics that might be critical to the market strategy. Given this we 
advance the hypothesis: 
H1a: RBSOs with PhD in the founding team have lower probabilities of exit. 
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Allied to the spinout process there is in most cases an incubation process that gives the 
spin-off firm essential support in terms of strategic management and business orientation. 
The support received in the incubator helps the founding team’s difficult task of defining 
the practical application of the technology and its marketing strategy. Various contributions 
have argued that the high start-up mortality is reduced with access of the incubated firms to 
such things as networking and credibility of incubator organisations, the access to 
subsidised rental space and collectively shared facilities, including laboratories and offices, 
and support of business assistance services, namely management support, marketing and 
accounting (Colombo and Delmastro, 2002; Schwartz, 2013; Wright et al., 2007). 
Schwartz (2013) provides empirical support for these arguments. The author found that the 
incubated firms have higher survival rates than firms located outside incubator 
organisations. Salvador (2011) attained similar findings from surveys conducted at 30 Turin 
academic spin-off firms whose integration in an incubator was seen as the solution for the 
lack of managerial competence. Based on these arguments and evidence we advance the 
following hypothesis regarding founding conditions: 
H1b: RBSOs that were in an incubator have lower probabilities of exit. 
Another founding condition that may be crucial in determining RBSOs´ survival is its 
initial size. Previous studies on firms´ survival have shown that firms that had larger initial 
size have lower persistent probabilities of exit (Agarwal and Gort, 2002; Geroski et al., 
2010; Mata et al., 1995). This is may be due to the effect of initial decisions that may persist 
because strategic decisions frequently involve the deployment of resources that cannot be 
reallocated later, that is, those that are sunk. When investment costs are sunk, there may be 
little point in reversing a decision, as costs cannot be recovered (Geroski et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, even if initial firm size is not at all important once all the adjustments are 
complete, the fact that firms adjust gradually toward their desired size makes it relevant to 
know their departing point as well as their current position (Agarwal and Gort, 2002; 
Geroski et al., 2010). RBSOs with larger start-up size are endowed with more resources and 
capabilities therefore have better chances of growing more and adjust more easily toward 
their desired size. As such we predict the following hypothesis: 
H1c: RBSOs that had larger initial size have lower persistent probabilities of exit. 
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Spin-off´s parent organisation 
Previous evidence on corporate spin-offs has shown that their survival is linked to their 
parent organisation characteristics. Factors such as reputation, size, access to formal and 
even tacit knowledge, as well as financial resources and network capabilities, have been 
pointed out as important features in the relationship between parent and spin-off 
(Andersson et al., 2012; Eriksson and Kuhn, 2006; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Klepper and 
Thompson, 2010; Thompson, 2007). Similar effects have been pointed out in the context 
of academic spin-offs with particular emphasis on the role of strong ties with the 
sponsoring university (Johansson et al., 2005; Lockett and Wright, 2005; Rothaermel and 
Thursby, 2005; Walter et al., 2006; Zhang, 2009). As such, it is common for RBSOs to 
locate near the parent university not only to benefit from pure cost advantages yielded by 
proximity but because their social ties enable them to access to academic knowledge and 
resources (Audretsch et al., 2005; Heblich and Slavtchev, 2013; Rasmussen and Borch, 
2010). 
So far, existing evidence has focused on the likelihood of spin-off creation rather than on 
their survival. Di Gregorio and Shane (2003) found that intellectual eminence of the parent 
organisation has a positive effect on new spin-off formation. Link and Scott (2005) found 
that being in the top 100 universities in terms of the level of R&D spending also had a 
positive effect on spin-off creation. Powers and McDougall (2005) obtained similar results 
by observing a positive effect of the level of university research funding and faculty quality 
on spin-off creation. However, Zucker et al., (1998) found that the concentration of 
startups in the biotechnology industry in the U.S.A. is more the result of a preference of 
scientists to locate near their parent organisation rather than the result of social ties and 
meetings between local firms and scientists. Given this evidence we argue that the parent 
organisation plays an important in the survival of spin-offs and we predict the following 
hypotheses: 
H2a: RBSOs are more likely to survive the higher the reputation of the parent organisation. 
H2b: RBSOs are more likely to survive the larger is the parent organisation. 
H2c: RBSOs located near the parent organisation are more likely to survive. 
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Spin-off´s region 
The geographical location of the firms seems to exert a positive effect on business rate of 
growth, where some regions that are characterized by high resources and wide market 
opportunities are more conducive to firm growth. As such, metropolitan areas hold strong 
attractions for small firms with high technological ability. Indeed the spatial concentration 
of institutions of higher education, technological research facilities and centers of 
knowledge in metropolitan areas increases information accessibility and has a positive 
influence on firms’ innovative capacity (Frenkel, 2001; Holl, 2004; Smith and Bagchi-Sen, 
2006). 
Agglomeration externalities are frequently pointed out as an important determinant of 
firms´ geographical concentration. Audretsch et al., (2005) argue that knowledge spillovers 
represent a significant form of agglomeration externalities and that the location decision of 
new firms should be influenced significantly by access to the sources of such spillovers. 
The propensity to cluster geographically should be higher in industries where knowledge 
and innovation activities plays a more important role, namely for high technology and 
knowledge-based industries and services (Baptista and Mendonça, 2010; Magrini and 
Galliano, 2012). According to Woodward et al. (2006) the high-technology plant births are 
highly concentrated around some regions. From an empirical study of high-technology 
location decisions in U.S. counties, the authors found evidence that agglomeration effects, 
the availability of qualified labor and natural amenities, as well as, university R&D 
expenditures exert a positive influence on the decision to locate high-technology firms in a 
county. 
Regarding start-ups, the literature postulates a positive link between entrepreneurship and 
innovation performance (Baptista et al., 2008) where high start-up rates are associated with 
higher levels of technological innovation in the developed countries (Anokhin and 
Wincent, 2012). Regarding the specific case of knowledge-based start-ups, the entry rate 
across regions measures the capacity of region on catching up start-up firms. The regions 
with high entry rates are more attractive for knowledge-based firms (Baptista and 
Mendonça, 2010). In view of this evidence we argue that location characteristics matters to 
RBSOs survival and we advance the following hypotheses: 
H3a: RBSOs are more likely to survive if it is located in metropolitan area; 
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H3b: RBSOs are more likely to survive if it is located in regions with an agglomeration of high technology 
firms;  
H3c: RBSOs are more likely to survive if it is located in regions with high entry rate. 
3. Data collection and descriptive statistics 
3.1. Data collection 
In this study we use the population of Portuguese RBSOs created since 1979 until 2007. In 
order to identify the population of Portuguese spin-off firms, a comprehensive list was 
made of spinout firms from Portuguese public research organisations. In this regard we 
started by collecting information from universities and other public research organisations 
in order to identify their spin-off firms. Whenever this information was not available, we 
contacted the organisation to apply for the identification of their spin-offs. This process 
proved to be quite lengthy and particularly pertinent because it was crucial to ensure that all 
the spin-off firms were identified and checked.  
Whereas the vast majority of the spin-off firms only make their legal registration when they 
actually have prospects of business or commercialisation of the technology (EC, 2003) it 
was necessary to verify the legal constitution of all the spin-off firms identified. After this 
procedure, carried out at the Institute of Registration and Notary Affairs (IRN – Ministry 
of Justice), we identified a total of 327 spin-off research firms legally set up until the end of 
2007. 
For all these firms, we collected information up to 2009 on the year of creation, location, 
sector of activity, the number of employees at founding date, parent organisation and year 
of death(if applicable).This gathering of information was carried out by phases. We began 
by accessing the data published by the firms themselves in their annual reports and 
websites (official pages). For more specific information we inquired the firms by e-mail and 
later, when necessary, we contacted them by phone.  
With regard to those firms considered inactive, we classified the firms as “dead” in the case  
where they actually declared inactivity with the Ministry of Finance. For this identification, 
we initially listed the firms where we saw subsequent ineffectiveness of the firm’s services 
and the impossibility of telephone contact with it, then proceeded to confirm the inactivity 
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of the firm concerned with the Ministry of Finance. It should be noted that, following 
Nerkar and Shane (2003) and Zhang (2009), we considered the acquired firms as survivor 
firms because despite the loss of “legal identity” the resources were maintained, both 
human and technological, even if integrated in another firm. During the observed period, 
1979 – 2009, only 8 Portuguese spin-off firms were acquired by multinational firms, which 
thus began to exploit the technology previously developed by the spin-off firm.   
Information regarding the parent organisation was collected from the Ministry of Science 
and Higher Education (MCTES) and from the Webometrics Ranking of World Universities. Data 
regarding the characteristics of the region where the spin-off is located was collected from 
Quadros de Pessoal database, which results from information gathered yearly by the 
Portuguese Ministry of Social Security and Labor, for the period 1986 to 2009, on the basis 
of mandatory information submitted by firms. 
3.2. Patterns of RBSOs survival in Portugal 
The first Portuguese RBSO dates from 1979, although in fact, the emergence of this type 
of firm only started to be visible from the mid 1980’s onwards (Figure 3.1). Analyzing the 
evolution in the process of Portuguese RBSO creation, it is important to note that the 
biggest – although not radical - transition in terms of increase in number firms took place 
in the early 1990’s. Indeed, 39.45% of the firms were created between 1990 and 2000 and 
54.13% after 2000.  
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Ilustração 6 Figure 3.1 - Number of Portuguese RBSOs by founding date (1979-2007). 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Of the 327 the total spin-offs created, only 60 firms closed their activity in the observed 
period of 30 years. This reduced death risk is in accordance with previous empirical studies 
that mention the high levels of survival of the RBSOs vis-à-vis other start-up firms (Zhang, 
2009). For our research we will only consider the period from 1995 to 2009. This is due to 
data constraints regarding the parent organisation, which is only available from 1994 
onward. It should be noted that between 1979 and 1994 no firm closed activity and that 
the evolution of spin-off research firms in Portugal occurred predominantly in the mid-
nineties, as in the rest of Europe (EC, 2003). 
Considering the survival levels by age of the spin-off firms, we observe that most of the 
failures occur in the early stages of the start-ups’ life (Figure 3.2). Only 9.34% of these 
firms fail in their first year of activity but failures increase substantially in the two 
subsequent years, to a cumulative total of 28.66% by the third year, which is in line with the 
stylised fact that most of the unsuccessful start-ups fail in the early stages of their life. The 
probability of failure for the start-ups that survive the first years of activity declines steadily 
with the firm’s age. This is consistent with evidence that older firms are more diversified 
and less risky than younger firms (Agarwal and Audretsch, 2001). 
Ilustração 7 Figure 3.2 - Number of Portuguese RBSO that fail by age. 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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About 38% of the spin-off firms say they do not have any full-time worker at date of 
creation. In fact the human resources of RBSOs are commonly composed of researchers 
who are contractually linked to the educational and research institutions, including grant 
holders, graduate or PhD students and even part-time workers. Only at an advanced stage 
of product or business development do the spin-off firms have the financial capacity for 
the founders to decide to “break” their link with the universities and dedicate themselves 
exclusively to the firm and/or to hire workers (Corolleur et al., 2004).  
Of the total of 60 firms that failed, 100% are in fact micro firms, thus having less than 10 
full-time employees (Table 3.1). It should be noted that 78.33% of the firms that closed 
said they had no full-time employees at founding date.  
According to the literature, Mustar (1997) emphasises that, although they survived, the 
RBSOs remained small and over 80% had less than 10 employees. In the same way 
Harrison and Leitch (2010) state that the RBSOs start small and remain small. 
Tabel a 6 Table 3.1 – Number of Portuguese RBSO that fail by start-up size. 
N.º of Employees at founding date 
Firms founded  Firms that fail Death Rate 
N.º %  N.º % 
Micro (0 - 9) 319 97.55  60 100.00 18.81 
Small (10 - 49) 7 02.14  0 00.00 00.00 
Medium (50 - 249) 1 00.31  0 00.00 00.00 
Large (> 250) 0 00.00  0 00.00 00.00 
Total 327 100  60 100  
Source: Own calculations. 
Regarding the sectoral distribution of the RBSOs, the sector of software and multimedia 
Services represents 40.67% of the population with 133 RBSOs, followed by the 
biotechnology and biochemistry with 64 firms (19.57%). The smaller proportion 
corresponds to engineering and materials with 19 RBSOs (5.81%).  
Considering the firms that closed activity, it should be noted that the high –tech services, 
that includes a variety of services for firms that operated in services such as health services, 
design, archaeology and sports, has the highest death rate (33.33%). Followed by the 
software sector and multimedia services in which 21.81% of the spin-off firms that were 
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created ended by closing in the observed period. The sector with the lowest percentage of 
failures is the “energy and environment” in which only two firms closed (4.88%). 
Tabel a 7 Table 3.2 – Number of Portuguese RBSO that fail by sector. 
Sectors 
Firms founded  Firms that fail Death Rate 
N.º %  N.º % 
Software and multimedia 133 40.67  29 48.33 21.81 
Biotechnology;  Biochemistry 64 19.57  8 13.33 12.50 
Energy and environment 41 12.54  2 3.33 4.88 
Electronics ;Instrumentation 34 10.40  4 6.68 11.77 
Engineering 19 5.81  5 8.33 26.32 
High-tech Services 36 11.01  12 20.00 33.33 
Total 327 100  60 100  
Source: Own calculations. 
The vast majority of the RBSOs (78.9%) originate from the seven largest public 
universities, or from research organisations associated to them. The remaining RBSOs 
originate from other public universities and public research laboratories, although there are 
also some private universities and a couple of polytechnic institutions among the parent 
organisations.  
Considering the firms that have failed, it should be noted that the Catholic University of 
Portugal has a percentage of 40% of closures. This private university has a particularity 
because of a total of 10 firms created, 6 are from the biotechnology sector which could 
explain the high death rate. It should be pointed out that Technical University of Lisboa 
has the largest number of firms created (18.04%) and a survival rate of 91.52%.  
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Tabel a 8 Table 3.3 – Number of Portuguese RBSO that fail by parent. 
Parent 
Firms founded  Firms that fail Death Rate 
N.º %  N.º % 
University of Algarve 10 03.06  1 1.67 10.00 
University of Aveiro 15 04.59  3 05.00 20.00 
University of Coimbra 56 17.13  10 16.67 17.86 
University of Lisboa 12 03.67  3 05.00 25.00 
University of Minho 45 13.76  9 15.00 20.00 
Catholic University of Portugal 10 03.06  4 06.67 40.00 
Nova University of Lisboa 23 07.03  5 08.33 21.74 
University of Porto 48 14.68  9 15.00 18.75 
Technical University of Lisboa 59    18.04  5 08.30 08.48 
INESC 14 04.28  3 05.00 21.43 
Others 35 10.70  8 13.33 22.86 
Total 327 100  60 100  
Source: Own calculations. 
4. Method and empirical variables 
4.1. Method 
In this paper the event is the failure of a research-based spin-off founded in Portugal from 
1979 until 2007; the failure is define as a firm that ceases operations. For those firms that 
have not exited at the end of our period of analysis, we do not have information on how 
long they survive (our empirical approach deals with this right censoring). The probability 
that a firm remains in activity, i.e., survives, until time tis given by the survivor function as:  
              (1) 
The conditional failure rate of a firm, known as hazard function h(t), is defined as the 
(limiting) probability that the failure event occurs in a given interval, conditional upon the 
firm having survived to the beginning of that interval, divided by the width of the interval:  
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(2) 
So the hazard function gives the instantaneous failure rate at t given that the firm has 
survived up to time. The hazard function is usually expressed in terms of the probability 
distribution F and the density function f of the firm’s duration as:  
      
     
      
  
     
    
 
(3) 
where the probability density function of T is 
                              (4) 
Besides the non-parametric approach, it is crucial to analyse the impact of covariates on the 
firms’ survival by using a multivariate model of the life duration. 
We can estimate the relationship between the hazard rate and the covariates without having 
to make specific assumptions about the underlying distribution. This approach results in 
models referred as semi-parametric. The Cox model (1972), as a proportional hazard 
model, assumes that the hazard rate is: 
 ( |  )                 )  (5) 
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function, x is a vector of covariates variables and β is the 
vector of regression parameters. The Cox model makes no assumptions about the shape of 
the hazard over the time, i.e., the baseline hazard function can be left unestimated. Then it 
is possible to obtain estimates for β avoiding the risk of mis-specifying the baseline hazard 
function. 
Considering that from the survival data is possible to specify the distribution of the 
baseline hazard function it may be advantageous to use parametric models. These models 
can be fit following a proportional hazard (PH) parameterisation (such exponential, 
Weibull and Gompertz models) or a log-time parameterisation, also known as the 
accelerated failure-time (AFT) metric (namely exponential, Weibull, lognormal, log-logistic 
and gamma models). Some models (for example the exponential and Weibull) models can 
accommodate both the PH and AFT assumptions, but they are still the same model.  
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The Gompertz model is suitable for modeling data with monotone hazard rates that either 
increase or decrease exponentially with time. It assumes a baseline hazard of the form: 
                           (6) 
where   is the shape parameter estimated from the data and the scale parameter is 
parameterised as exp (β0). Given a set of covariates, xj, under the proportional hazard (PH) 
model,  
 ( |  )                 )  (7) 
so the hazard function is 
 ( |  )                            (8) 
The shape parameter  determines the shape of the hazard function. If  >0 then the hazard 
increases exponentially with time; if  < 0 the hazard decreases exponentially with time. In 
the specific case of  = 0the hazard is            for all t, i.e., it reduces to the exponential 
model.  
4.2. Empirical variables 
In order to test our hypotheses regarding founding conditions we included in our 
regression the following variables: Founder PhD, a dummy variable that equals 1if there is at 
least one founder with a PhD degree at founding date, and zero otherwise; Incubated, a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm was located in an incubator, and zero otherwise; 
Start-up Size, was measured by the number of full-time employees at founding date.  
Parent characteristics were measured by the variables Parent Reputation and Parent Size. For 
Parent Reputation we split universities created before and after the renewal of the university 
education policy in Portugal in 1973. Given the short life-span of the most recent 
Portuguese universities, the oldest ones are usually looked up with higher reputation than 
younger universities or institutions research institutions. This observation is sustained by 
the fact that there is a world ranking for younger universities, i.e., universities with less than 
50 years old (see Times Higher Education 100 under 50 University Ranking). Then we examined 
the overall academic rating score of universities published in the Webometrics Ranking of 
World Universities and we built a dummy variable that equals 1 if the oldest parent is among 
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the Top 500. In Portugal these are University of Lisboa, Technical University of Lisboa, 
University of Porto and University of Coimbra.  
Parent Size was measured by dummies variables for each of the following cohorts: first 
cohort valued 1 if the parent have no graduates, which includes public research 
laboratories; second group valued 1 if the parent has an average number of graduates 
between 1 and 1499; third group valued 1 if the parent has an average number of graduates 
between 1500 and 2999; finally a group valued 1 for parents with an average number of 
graduates above 3000. Parent Proximity is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is 
located less than 50 km from its parent, and zero otherwise and is aimed to proxy the 
importance of ties between the spin-off and its parent. 
Differences in the characteristics of the region where the spin-off is located factors were 
measured by the covariates Metropolitan Area, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is 
located in the metropolitan area of Lisbon or Porto at founding date, and zero otherwise. 
High-tech, which controls for potential spillovers and is measured by the ratio of the number 
of firms on high-technology industries the total number of firms in the municipality 
(Baptista and Mendonça, 2010) in which the firm is located. Following Eurostat, high-
technology industries included high-tech and medium-high manufacturing firms and, also, 
knowledge intensive services (KIS). Entry rate, is the ratio of the number of new firms entry 
to the total number of firms in the municipality and measures the capacity of region on 
catch up start-up firms (Baptista and Mendonça, 2010). 
As additional controls we included the covariate Age, measured as the number of years 
elapsed from the founding date. Older firms are more diversified and less risky than 
younger firms, which increases their likelihood of survival (Agarwal, 1997; Agarwal and 
Audretsch, 2001). Finally, sectoral dummy variables were included in order to control for 
differences in the technological regime as well as market specific differences in the sector in 
which the firm operates. The sectors included are: Software, Biotechnology, Energy, Electronics, 
and Services. Table 3.4 presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and 
covariates and Table 3.5 the correlation matrix. Correlation analysis indicates low levels of 
correlations (<0.3). The highest correlation was between the Parent Reputation and Parent 
Size (0.55), suggesting that multi-collinearity was absent. 
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Tabel a 9 Table 3.4 - Descriptive statistics of dependent variable and covariates. 
Variable % Min Max Mean S.D. 
Dependent variable      
Died 2.26    0.15 
Covariates      
Founder PhD 39.13    0.49 
Incubated  75.81    0.43 
Start-up Size   0 60 2.56 5.80 
Age  1 30 7.07 5.16 
Parent Reputation 53.24    0.50 
Parent Size [0] 11.02    0.31 
Parent Size [1-1499] 03.01    0.17 
Parent Size [1500-2999] 18.92    0.39 
Parent Size [>3000] 67.04    0.47 
Parent Proximity 88.19    0.32 
Metropolitan Area 54.51    0.50 
High-tech  -6.93 -1.85 -4.29 0.63 
Entry rate   -5.62 -0.47 -3.92 1.10 
Software 45.11    0.50 
Biotechnology 14.90    0.36 
Energy 12.90    0.34 
Electronics 11.66    0.32 
Engineering 05.19    0.22 
Services 10.23    0.30 
Notes: N = 266 firms, 2658 firm-year spells. 
  
 59 
 
Tabel a 10 Table 3.5 - Correlations for the dependent variable and covariates. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Died           
Founder PhD -0.02          
Incubated -0.02 0.01         
Start-up Size  -0.05** -0.02 0.10**        
Age 0.02** 0.01 -0.08** 0.08**       
Parent Reputation  -0.03 0.06** 0.12** -0.05* -0.03*      
Parent Size  -0.01 0.10** -0.13** -0.18** -0.04* 0.55**     
Parent Proximity -0.04* 0.03 0.10** 0.05** 0.10** -0.07** 0.04*    
Metropolitan Area -0.02 0.08** 0.09** 0.13** 0.09** 0.16** -0.15** 0.15**   
High-tech -0.08** -0.03 -0.01 -0.04* -0.10** -0.06** 0.07** -0.08** 0.09**  
Entry rate -0.06** 0.02 -0.06** -0.06** -0.13** -0.07** -0.01 -0.15 -0.07 0.44 
Note: **, * means significant at 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
5. Results 
The non-parametric estimation of the survivor function plotted in Figure 3.3 shows a 
survival rate of 99.27% after the first year, 89.52% after six years and 70.14% after 
seventeen years. These results are similar to those reported in previous empirical studies. In 
particular, Nerkar and Shane (2003) estimated a survival rate of 69% after seventeen years. 
Our results also reveal show that Portuguese RBSOs survival rate is superior to other 
Portuguese start-ups (Mata el al., 1995; Nunes and Sarmento, 2011). 
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Ilustração 8 Figure 3.3 - Kaplan- Meier Survival Function of Portuguese RBSOs. 
 
In order to analyse the determinants of RBSOs’ survival and test our hypotheses, we first 
use a semi-parametric approach and estimated a Cox proportional hazard (PH) model. This 
is shown in column (1) of Table 3.6. Considering that Portuguese spin-offs firms have 
different parent organisations and thus share common characteristics according to the 
parent of origin, we adjust the standard errors for a possible intra-parent correlation by 
clustering on the parent, and then obtained the robust estimates of variance. Regarding the 
proportional hazards assumption and based on Schoenfeld residuals test, we find no 
evidence that our specification violates the PH assumption (global chi-squared=8.42 with 
significance level 0.588). 
Then we estimated the parametric proportional hazards models (Exponential, Weibull, 
Gompertz), columns (2) to (4) in Table 3.6. These models produce results that are directly 
comparable to those produced by Cox regression. In fact, in all PH models (semi-
parametric or parametric), the exponential of estimated coefficient indicates the ratio of the 
hazard for a 1-unit change in the corresponding covariate, i.e., a positive coefficient reflects 
a higher hazard and a negative coefficient represents a smaller hazard. Thus comparing the 
estimated coefficients of the parametric models with those reported by Cox model we may 
verify that they are very similar evidencing an adequate parameterisation (Table 3.6).  
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Tabel a 11 Table 3.6 - Estimates of the determinants of RBSOs´ survival (Proportional 
Hazard Models). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Covariates Cox Exponential Weibull Gompertz 
Founder PhD -0.155 
(0.309) 
-0.202 
(0.323) 
-0.148 
(0.301) 
-0.125 
(0.313) 
Incubated -0.086 
(0.235) 
-0.084 
(0.257) 
-0.027 
(0.280) 
-0.003 
(0.308) 
Start-upSize -0.620*** 
(0.134) 
-0.579*** 
(0.143) 
-0.650*** 
(0.144) 
-0.713*** 
(0.143) 
Age -0.249*** 
(0.094) 
-0.001 
(0.038) 
-0.219** 
(0.087) 
-0.659* 
(0.368) 
Parent Reputation -0.417 
(0.295) 
-0.161 
(0.369) 
-0.539 
(0.333) 
-0.773*** 
(0.225) 
Parent Size [0] -0.465 
(0.383) 
-0.135 
(0.309) 
-0.664* 
(0.367) 
-0.966** 
(0.467) 
Parent Size [1-1499] -0.577*** 
(0.207) 
-0.130 
(0.195) 
-0.777*** 
(0.219) 
-1.203*** 
(0.270) 
Parent Size [1500-2999] -0.073 
(0.206) 
0.305 
(0.300) 
-0.259 
(0.307) 
-0.475** 
(0.230) 
Parent Proximity -0.569 
(0.373) 
-0.477 
(.340) 
-0.455 
(0.411) 
-0.553 
(0.496) 
Metropolitan Area -0.368 
(0.323) 
-0.333 
(0.272) 
-0.362 
(0.357) 
-0.358 
(0.432) 
High-tech -0.483 
(0.312) 
-0.558* 
(0.325) 
-0.578* 
(0.305) 
-0.495* 
(0.269) 
Entry rate -0.333*** 
(0.117) 
-0.382*** 
(0.120) 
-0.311** 
(0.140) 
-0.270** 
(0.132) 
Software -0.302 
(0.330) 
-0.188 
(0.401) 
-0.297 
(0.392) 
-.0307 
(0.306) 
Biotechnology -1.271*** 
(0.216) 
-1.019*** 
(0.280) 
-1.125*** 
(0.242) 
-1.319*** 
(0.177) 
Energy -1.938** 
(0.784) 
-1.591** 
(0.753) 
-1.869** 
(0.812) 
-2.137** 
(0.838) 
Electronics -1.112** 
(0.452) 
-1.010** 
(0.411) 
-1.136** 
(0.497) 
-1.172* 
(0.564) 
Engineering 0.074 
(0.316) 
0.209 
(0.369) 
0.133 
(0.372) 
-0.097 
(0.332) 
Constant  -6.090*** 
(1.996) 
-7.151*** 
(1.981) 
-4.733*** 
(1.694) 
Log-likelihood -270.913 -148.701 -137.809 -128.417 
AIC 561.826 317.402 295.618 276.834 
Notes: Number of observations: 2658. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, clustered on the 
parent organisation. ***, **, * means significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
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In order to select the parametric model that fits better our data we also estimated the 
Accelerate Failure-Time Parametric Models (Table 3.7)10. Since that only the exponential 
versus Weibull, and lognormal or Weibull versus generalised gamma are nested, we cannot 
use the likelihood-ratio and Wald tests to discriminate among all the parametric models. 
Considering the non-nesting evidence, an appropriate alternative is the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC). In assessing model ﬁt, the AIC combines two criteria: parsimony and the 
log-likelihood. The smaller the AIC score, the more appropriate the model.  
 
                                                             
10In AFT models the effect of covariates is multiplicative with respect to survival time, whereas for PH models the assumption is that the 
effect of covariates is multiplicative with respect to the hazard. In the case of AFT models, the parameters measure the effect of the 
correspondent covariate on the mean survival time. 
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Tabel a 12 Table 3.7 - Estimates of the determinants of RBSOs´ survival (Accelerated Failure-
Time Models). 
Covariates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exponential Weibull Log-logistic Lognormal 
Founder PhD 0.202 
(0.323) 
0.058 
(0.118) 
0.055 
(0.128) 
0.042 
(0.143) 
Incubated -0.084 
(0.257) 
-0.011 
(0.111) 
-0.011 
(0.111) 
0.079 
(0.135) 
Start-upSize 0.579*** 
(0.143) 
0.255*** 
(0.046) 
0.241*** 
(0.043) 
0.224*** 
(0.040) 
Age 0.001 
(0.038) 
0.086*** 
(0.025) 
0.089*** 
(0.024) 
0.087*** 
(0.030) 
Parent Reputation 0.161 
(0.369) 
0.212 
(0.145) 
0.266 
(0.095) 
0.275*** 
(0.070) 
Parent Size [0] 0.135 
(0.309) 
0.260 
(.149) 
0.289 
(0.227) 
0.231 
(.304) 
Parent Size [1-1499] 0.130 
(0.195) 
0.305*** 
(0.195) 
0.409*** 
(0.086) 
0.448*** 
(0.112) 
Parent Size [1500-2999] -0.305 
(0.300) 
0.102 
(0.078) 
0.179 
(0.110) 
0.219 
(0.134) 
Parent Proximity 0.477 
(0.340) 
0.179 
(0.127) 
0.224 
(0.163) 
0.346** 
(0.176) 
Metropolitan Area 0.333 
(0.272) 
0.142 
(0.151) 
0.137 
(0.168) 
0.159 
(0.182) 
High-tech 0.558* 
(0.325) 
0.227* 
(0.121) 
0.239* 
(0.141) 
0.190 
(0.159) 
Entry rate 0.382*** 
(0.120) 
0.122* 
(0.068) 
0.125* 
(0.074) 
0.134* 
(0.074) 
Software 0.188 
(0.401) 
0.117 
(0.159) 
0.124 
(0.173) 
0.160 
(0.205) 
Biotechnology 1.019*** 
(0.280) 
0.442*** 
(0.103) 
0.406*** 
(0.119) 
0.398*** 
(0.133) 
Energy 1.591** 
(0.753) 
0.733** 
(0.347) 
0.738** 
(0.343) 
0.755** 
(0.343) 
Electronics 1.010** 
(0.411) 
0.446*** 
(0.164) 
0.449*** 
(0.168) 
0.528*** 
(0.176) 
Engineering -0.209 
(0.369) 
-0.052 
(0.150) 
-0.073 
(0.157) 
-0.132 
(0.173) 
Constant 6.090*** 
(1.996) 
2.805*** 
(0.897) 
2.665*** 
(0.976) 
2.413** 
(1.069) 
Log-likelihood -148.701 -137.809 -139.543 -142.255 
AIC 317.402 295.618 299.086 304.510 
Notes: Number of observations: 2658. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * means 
significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. Gamma model is not concave.  
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Comparing all parametric models, we conclude that Gompertz model fitted data better 
than other distributions in multivariate analysis. In fact this distribution presents the 
smallest AIC value and also the largest log-likelihood (see Table 3.6 and Table 3.7). Thus, 
we will comment on the Gompertz estimates. 
Regarding the characteristics of the founding team, our results do not support our 
Hypothesis 1a. Having a founding team member with PhD does not increase the likelihood 
of survival. This result seems to be in line with previous studies where there has been 
observed an ambiguous impact of founder’s education on firm’s performance (Helm and 
Mauroner, 2007). This result could also be explained by the argument that academic 
entrepreneurs have less skills regarding market and business management. However, in this 
regard we should be cautious in interpreting this result, as we do not know whether the 
PhD founding team member is actually an academic, though it is highly likely that it is.  
Interestingly, being in an incubator does not seem to be relevant in determining the 
survival of the spin-off as the coefficient of the dummy variable Incubated is not statistically. 
Hence Hypothesis 1b is not supported by the data, which raises some doubts regarding the 
importance of incubation on long-term spin-off survival. 
However, Start-up Size does seem to be key in explaining spin-off survival since results 
show that a one-employee increase on start-up size decreases the hazard by 50.98%, 
therefore providing support to Hypothesis 1c. This result is in line with previous evidence 
(e.g. Geroski et al., 2010). Likewise, if we consider the firm´s age, the results are in 
agreement with previous empirical studies, where older firms have higher probability of 
survival (Agarwal and Audretsch, 2001; Agarwal and Gort, 2002). One-year increase on Age 
decreases the hazard by 48.26%. Together, these results suggest that the key firm-level 
characteristics in determining RBSO spin-off survival are not different from those that are 
relevant to any other start-up. 
Regarding parent characteristics results show a positive impact of Parent Reputation on the 
survival of the spin-off firm. If the parent is classified among the top 4 ranking then its 
spin-off faces a hazard that is 46.16% of the hazard faced by spin-offs coming from a 
parent that is not in the top 4 ranking, therefore providing support to our Hypothesis 2a. 
This result is consistent with previous evidence that has found a positive role of intellectual 
eminence of the parent organisation on spin-offs´ survival (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; 
Link and Scott, 2005; Powers and McDougall, 2005). 
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Interestingly, we do not observe a monotonic relationship between Parent Size and spin-off 
survival hence Hypothesis 2b is not supported. Indeed, results show that the smallest 
cohort of the variable Parent Size has a positive impact on the spin-off survival. Specifically 
a spin-off from a public research laboratory (parent with no graduates) is thus estimated to 
face a hazard that is 38.06% of the hazard faced by firms with a larger parent. Then, the 
hazard decreases in the following cohort as spin-offs from parents with an average number 
of graduates between 1-1499 are estimated to face a hazard that is 30.03% of the hazard 
faced by firms with a larger parent. Then, spin-offs whose parents have an average number 
of 1500-2999 graduates face a hazard that is 62.19% of the hazard faced by firms with a 
larger parent (number graduates above 3000). These results are then suggesting that being 
spin-off from parents with more graduates does not bring any additional advantage 
regarding survival. 
Likewise, being located near the parent does not seem to have an impact on spin-offs 
survival. This result corroborates previous contributions that have argued that physical 
proximity may not be a necessary condition for knowledge exchange, as other types of 
proximity, such as cultural, organisational and relational proximity, might provide the 
advantages of physical proximity to firms’ innovation activities (Helmers and Rogers, 2011) 
and that being located near the parent is simply the result of a preference among academics 
and not so much as the exploitation of social ties (Zucker et al., 1998). Thus Hypothesis 3c 
is not supported. 
Results show that the being located in a metropolitan area is not important in determining 
RBSOs survival, meaning that our Hypothesis 3a is not supported. However, when the 
firm is located in a municipality with high density of firms on high-technology industries 
this decreases the hazard, i.e., a unit increase on high-tech firms rate decrease the hazard by 
39.04%. This result supports our Hypothesis 3b, thus the view that spillovers effects may 
be an important driver of RBSOs survival. Additionally, results also provide support for 
the positive influence of agglomeration economies on innovation (Magrini and Galliano, 
2012). Spin-offs located in municipalities with higher capacity to capture start-up firms 
have higher probability of survival. Estimates show that a unit increase of the variable Entry 
Rate decreases the hazard by 23.66%. Thus, Hypothesis 3c is supported. 
Finally, results show that the probability of survival varies according to the sector in which 
the spinoff operates. Specifically, RBSOs operating in the Biotechnology, Energy and Electronics 
have smaller hazard than firms operating in Services. 
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In order to check the robustness of our findings we reestimated our model controlling for 
parent organisation fixed effects. We fit a standard fixed effects model including indicator 
variables for parent clusters. In this model the effect of the parent organisation are treated 
as fixed and share the same baseline function, i.e., we assume that the parent has a direct 
multiplicative effect on the hazard function. 
Assuming the Gompertz distribution the fixed effects model presents similar results vis-a-vis 
the model with cluster (see Table 3.8). Estimates show a positive impact on RBSOs´ 
survival probability of Start-up Size, Age and location of spin-off firms in municipalities with 
high entry rates (Entry Rate) and high density of high-technology firms (High-tech). However, 
being located in a metropolitan area has now a significant and positive effect on survival. A 
RBSO located in a metropolitan area faces a hazard that is 51.43% of the hazard faced by a 
non-metropolitan firm, therefore providing support to Hypothesis 3a. In both models the 
Gompertz model presents a positive shape parameter ( > 0) thus we conclude that the 
hazard increases exponentially with time. 
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Tabel a 13 Table 3.8 - Estimates of the determinants of RBSOs´ survival (Robust-cluster and 
Fixed Effects Models). 
Covariates 
(1) (2) 
Cluster Fixed effects 
Founder PhD -0.125 
(0.313) 
-0.133 
(0.302) 
Incubated -0.003 
(0.308) 
-0.234 
(0.352) 
Start-upSize -0.713*** 
(0.143) 
-0.690*** 
(0.146) 
Age -0.659* 
(0.368) 
-0.742*** 
(0.172) 
Parent Reputation -0.773*** 
(0.225) 
 
_ 
Parent Size [0] -0.966** 
(0.467) 
_ 
Parent Size [1-1499] -1.203*** 
(0.270) 
_ 
Parent Size [1500-2999] -0.475** 
(0.230) 
_ 
Parent Proximity -0.553 
(0.496) 
-0.175 
(0.406) 
Metropolitan Area -0.358 
(0.432) 
-0.665* 
(0.349) 
High-tech -0.495* 
(0.269) 
-0.640*** 
(0.239) 
Entry rate -0.270** 
(0.132) 
-0.342* 
(0.182) 
Software -0.307 
(0.306) 
-0.477 
(0.384) 
Biotechnology -1.319*** 
(.177) 
-1.682*** 
(0.526) 
Energy -2.137** 
(0.838) 
-2.532** 
(0.805) 
Electronics -1.172* 
(0.564) 
-1.229** 
(0.652) 
Engineering -0.097 
(0.332) 
-0.152 
(0.569) 
Fixed Effects _ YES 
Constant -4.733*** 
(1.694) 
-7.798*** 
(1.734) 
Log-likelihood -128.417 -121.565 
AIC 276.834 293.130 
Gamma 0.81242 0.90211 
Notes: Number of observations: 2658. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses in column (1) and standard 
errors in column (2). ***, **, * means significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.  
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Considering the group effect analysis we also reestimated our model controlling first for 
random effects (shared frailty) and second for a stratified assumption (Cleves et al., 2010). 
In the case of the shared frailty we model correlation by assuming that it is induced by an 
unobserved random effect, or frailty, that is, shared among a group that have the same 
characteristics and by specifying the distribution of this random effect (gamma and inverse-
gaussian distributions). The likelihood-ratio test on the hypothesis that the frailty variance 
(theta) is equal to 0 presents a p-value of 1.000 and thus we find an insignificant frailty 
effect, i.e., no evidence of an unobserved heterogeneity. 
In alternative we run a stratified model. In this case we allow baseline hazards to be 
different for each stratum (parent) rather than constraining them to be multiplicative 
versions of each other as in fixed effects model. According to Wald tests none of the 
baseline hazards is significantly different from the other. 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
Previous studies have shown high levels of survival of RBSOs as soon as these exceed the 
so-called period of "infant mortality". Yet, few studies have focused on the determinants of 
these high survival rates. This paper fills this gap by providing evidence using a unique self-
collected data base that comprehends the population of RBSOs created in Portugal from 
1979 until to 2007. Specifically, we investigate the role of three types of effects that have 
been put forward in literature as being relevant to understand the survival of these 
particular firms, namely founding conditions, parent organisation characteristics and region 
characteristics where the spin-off firm is located.  
Our results suggest that start-up size is the founding condition that matters most to 
determine RBSOs´ survival, where the larger the start-up size the lower the probability of 
exit by the firm. The possession of a PhD degree by the team founders and the fact that 
the spin-off was in an incubator do not seem to be relevant in discriminating survival rates 
among spin-off firms. In this regard our results indicate that certain inherent characteristics 
common to RBSOs are less important to explain differences among survival rates than the 
well-known start-up size effect that has been found in firm survival studies and is common 
across different types of firms. A similar interpretation applies to the role of age where the 
older the spin-off is the lower the likelihood of exiting the market, which is in line with 
most survival studies.  
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Regarding the parent organisation characteristics, intellectual eminence or reputation and 
size seem to exert an important effect on spin-off survival. An interesting result that 
emerges from our data is that of non-linearity in the relationship between parent size and 
spin-off survival. In fact being a spin-off from the largest parent does not increase the 
likelihood of survival when compared to smaller parents. A possible explanation could be 
that smaller parents are more concerned about their spin-offs survival as spin-offs may 
contribute to increase their market recognition, whereas larger parent organisations do no 
feel the same kind of pressure. 
Another interesting result regards the spin-off physical proximity to its parent organisation. 
The non-significance of this covariate suggests that being located near its parent is more 
the result of a preference by academics rather than the importance of social ties, which 
corroborates Zucker´s (1998) findings. However, being located in a metropolitan area and 
in municipalities with high density of firms on high-technology industries and high entry 
rates seems to be important factors influencing the survival of spin-offs corroborating the 
largely accepted view of the importance of local spillovers and agglomeration externalities 
in determining firms´ survival. As such, there seems to be no difference between RBSOs 
and other start-ups regarding the region´s role on their survival. 
Our results provide several implications from a policy point of view. First, public policy 
and parent organisations should support RBSO firms by helping them to have more 
employees since their set-up. Second, parent organisations should focus their efforts in 
promoting their reputation as this intangible asset exerts a strong positive effect on 
survival. Third, local governments should implement policies that help the start-up of firms 
and contribute to the ease of doing business, so that they can attract new firms into the 
region, as agglomeration economies and spillovers effects are more important to spin-offs 
survival than being located in an incubator. 
A limitation of our data is that it does not allow us to properly identify the industry in 
which the firm operates according to the economic classification. We are only able to 
identify the technology area. Thus, two important lines for further research would be to 
explore the role played by market characteristics, namely competition, and by individual 
characteristics of the founding team members.  
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IV. The commercialisation decisions of research-based spin-offs: 
targeting the market for technologies 11 
 
Abstract 
This paper addresses the commercialisation decisions of research-based spin-off firms 
(RBSOs), focusing on the case of companies specialising in the production and sale of 
intellectual property – a model of entrepreneurial behaviour increasingly frequent in 
science-based fields and that research-based spin-offs may be more prone to adopt, given 
their specific characteristics. Combining insights from the economics of technological 
change and the strategic management of technology literature, we discuss the conditions 
that can influence firms’ ability to operate in the market for technology, and advance some 
theory-driven hypotheses regarding key factors that are likely to determine it – nature of 
knowledge being exploited, appropriability conditions, location and degree of control upon 
complementary assets and institutional setting of origin – as well as their impact upon 
firms’ decisions. These hypotheses are tested on a group of 80 European RBSOs, using 
data collected specifically for this purpose, on the basis of questionnaire-based interviews. 
This research adds to recent work on the determinants of the commercialisation strategy of 
technology-based SMEs, but by focusing on a particular group of companies – the RBSOs 
– we also take into consideration some distinctive characteristics of this group, which 
introduce some specificity in their innovative behaviour. 
 
1. Introduction 
Research-based spin-off companies (RBSOs) have recently become the focus of 
technology and innovation policies, being regarded as an instrument for the commercial 
exploitation of knowledge produced in public sector research organisations (Wright et al., 
2007). However, contrary to what is often assumed by policy makers, RBSOs are 
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heterogeneous companies, created in a diversity of conditions and displaying a variety of 
behaviours (Mustar et al., 2006), with implications for the role(s) they effectively play in the 
transformation of scientific and technological knowledge into economic value.  
One potential source of heterogeneity is the strategy adopted by the RBSO to 
commercialise their knowledge assets. In fact, RBSOs may opt for selling or licensing their 
technology or rather, decide to pursue with the development of products or services based 
on it. This is a major strategic choice for start-ups (Arora et al., 2001), which can have an 
“imprinting” effect (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990) and that is conducive to different 
modes of behaviour and thus to heterogeneity in the functions performed by RBSOs. To 
engage in the development of products or services and to bring them to the market, alone 
or in alliance with other firms, is the most typical strategy. However, the case of firms that 
specialise in the production and sale of intellectual property and thus operate in the 
“market for technologies” (Gans and Stern, 2003) is becoming more frequent, particularly 
in fields where markets for technology are more developed (Chesbrough, 2006). It remains, 
nevertheless, a relatively less understood phenomenon. 
However, we believe that this particular strategy deserves greater attention. In fact, it can 
be argued that the firms adopting it perform a qualitatively different but relevant function 
in the innovation system. They conduct the upstream transformation of scientific 
knowledge in still basic, but already tradable technologies (Autio, 1997), thus acting as 
specialised technology brokers, that transform and “package” knowledge, making it visible 
and intelligible to firms, which might be interested in it. Considering that advanced 
knowledge developed by research organisations goes frequently unexploited – due to the 
difficulties often experienced by existing firms in identifying it and to the presence of 
knowledge asymmetries between knowledge producer and user that make their 
disembodied transfer and absorption particularly complex (Dasgupta and David, 1994) – 
this function can be an important element in the dissemination of advanced knowledge that 
should be acknowledged and sustained by policy makers. Thus, it is important to gain a 
better understanding of the factors that enable its performance, in order to assist the 
decision making process of spin-off entrepreneurs as well as to inform policy formulation. 
This paper addresses the strategic decision made by RBSOs regarding the mode of 
commercialisation of their technology and its objective is exactly to understand the 
conditions associated with the option for selling or licensing intellectual property, as the 
firm main business. Drawing on two main theoretical sources – the economics of 
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technological change and the strategic management of technology – and combining them 
with insights from previous research on the behaviour of new technology-intensive firms, 
we advance a number of factors that are expected to influence RBSOs’ ability to adopt this 
commercialisation strategy and formulate a number of hypotheses regarding their impact 
upon RBSO decisions. These hypotheses are subsequently tested on a sample of European 
RBSOs.  
Our research adds to recent work on the determinants of the commercialisation strategy of 
technology-based SMEs (Gambardella and Giarratana, 2007; Gans et al., 2002; Giuri and 
Luzzi, 2005; Hicks and Hedge, 2005; Novelli and Rao, 2007; Pries and Guild, 2007). 
However, by focusing is on one particular type of technology-based company – the RBSO 
– we take into consideration the specific characteristics of these companies, which are not 
addressed in other research and which may, in some cases, favour the operation in the 
markets for technology. 
2. Commercialisation strategies of RBSOs  
RBSO are, by definition, firms set-up to exploit scientific and technological knowledge 
developed in academic research (Mustar et al., 2006). In order to pursue with this goal, the 
new firm has to make a key strategic choice regarding the mode of capturing value from its 
knowledge assets: it may sell/license the actual technology, or engage in the development 
of products or services based on it. The decision on how to transform knowledge in 
economic value also corresponds to a strategic decision on the type of market to target: 
firms can opt for trading in the market for technologies, or chose to trade in the market for 
products (Arora et al., 2001). Firms that engage in product development may also chose to 
simultaneously sell (part of) their technologies, for various reasons (Lichtenthaler, 2008), 
although this option is less likely in resource constrained start-ups. These may nevertheless 
engage in some technology trade activities, while developing the core product (Kollmer and 
Dowling, 2004). The requirements for operating in each type of market are different (Gans 
and Stern, 2003) and thus, to explain the decision made by RBSOs concerning the mode of 
commercialisation of their technologies, it is necessary to understand the conditions that 
enable start-ups to comply with those requirements.  
Early choices made by the entrepreneurs are not necessarily definitive. Subsequent learning 
processes may correct decisions made under limited information (given high technological 
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and market uncertainty often coupled with lack of business experience) (Costa et al., 2004). 
Technological and market volatility may require adapting to changes in the competitive 
conditions (Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004). But even if firms’ strategies can be readjusted 
through time, early choices are important because they will have an “imprinting effect” 
upon the company created (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Stinchcombe, 1965). In 
fact, they influence the configuration of the new firm, guiding decisions regarding resource 
mobilisation, competence development and search for relationships. They may also 
constrain the firm’s subsequent evolution, by reducing the margin for later choices (Arora 
and Gambardella, 2010). The decision on the mode of commercialisation is, therefore, a 
major strategic choice for start-ups, with impact on the organisation of their innovative 
activities, on the outcome of these activities and on the way they interact with their 
environment and thus on the functions played by the firms in the innovation system 
(Autio, 1997).  
This research focuses on the companies that target the market for technologies – that is, 
markets where technology is traded in the form of intellectual property (IP) or other 
intangible forms, rather than embodied in products or processes (Arora et al., 2001). The 
option for trading in intellectual property assets – and particularly for doing it as the main 
business and not as a complementary or a transitory activity, while the core product or 
service is being developed – has been an exception, until recently (Teece, 2006). However, 
we observe an increase in the number of companies that adopt this commercialisation 
strategy (Chesbrough, 2006; Hicks and Hedge, 2005; Pries and Guild, 2007), which can be 
explained by institutional changes in the organisation of the academic system, the division 
of labour between private and public organisations, the intellectual property rights system 
and the financial system (Antonelli and Teubal, 2008; Arora and Gambardella, 2010; 
Bekkers et al., 2006; Coriat et al., 2003; Wright et al., 2007). These changes enabled 
extensive patenting of results of public research and encouraged company formation to 
exploit them, leading to the emergence of firms that perform basic research, appropriate its 
results through patenting and whose assets are intellectual property rights (IPR) instead of 
products or services, but who are able to obtain capital on the basis of the value attributed 
to that IP. The expansion of markets for technology, triggered by the strengthening of 
appropriability regimes and by changes in the technology strategies of large firms, created 
new opportunities for these research-based firms, enabling them to co-exist with 
established ones, to whom they act as specialised suppliers of contract research and basic 
technologies (Arora et al., 2001; Chesbrough, 2006).  
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The functions performed by these new firms can be viewed at the light of the 
“technological articulation process”, described by Autio (1997), through which scientific 
knowledge is transformed in basic technologies, still generic in nature, which are then 
transformed into application specific technologies. Different actors will be involved in 
these processes, which may configure specific niches for different categories of firms. The 
first, upstream, transformation is more likely to be conducted by “science-based firms”, 
which display characteristics that are frequently present in spin-offs from research. The 
tasks involved in this upstream transformation may not be easily tackled by people, who 
were not involved in the original development of the technology (Zucker et al., 1998) and 
can thus configure a business in itself, with which scientific entrepreneurs may find 
particular affinity.  
In fact, RBSOs may be especially prone to engage in this type of business. First because the 
nature of the knowledge they are exploiting – scientific or technological knowledge 
originating from academic research – favours it (Jong, 2006; Shane, 2001). Second because 
it may be cognitively closer to founders’ skills and identity as researchers: RBSOs 
entrepreneurial teams usually involve at least (or exclusively) some of the academic 
scientists, who developed the technology and thus scientific competences and networks, 
are likely to be prevalent, even if some teams integrate individuals with managerial 
experience (Ensley and Hmieleski, 2005; Murray, 2004). Finally, because RBSOs originate 
from a non-commercial environment, which not only may have culturally shaped the 
individuals involved in their creation, but can also exert (directly or indirectly) some 
influence on the decisions made at start-up, while being less likely to provide support in the 
access to non-technical competences and resources (Clarysse et al., 2005; Rothaermel and 
Hill, 2005). Thus RBSOs can be regarded as a particularly interesting setting to investigate 
this emerging strategic behaviour.  
Despite some recent interest in this commercialisation strategy (Bekkers et al., 2006; Gans 
et al., 2002; Hicks and Hedge, 2005; Kollmer and Dowling, 2004), the conditions that are 
behind the emergence of these firms and that sustain their development are still relatively 
less understood, which makes them a relevant object of analysis. The particular case of 
RBSOs is even less explored: while some authors have described spin-offs’ business 
models that fit within the technology trade strategy (e.g. Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004; 
Stankiewicz, 1994), attempts to explain the behaviour of these firms are rare (Pries and 
Guild, 2007). That is, therefore, the objective of this research.  
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Thus we formulate the following research questions: 
 Which factors influence RBSOs start-up decision to target technology markets? 
 Which factors influence RBSOs ability to operate in technology markets as the firm 
main business (at a steady state)? 
 How determinant is the early decision in the subsequent positioning? 
3. Conceptual framework 
Our approach to the factors that influence RBSOs decision on the commercialisation 
strategy combines insights from two main theoretical sources: the economics of 
technological change and the strategic management of technology. Drawing on these two 
streams of literature we build a conceptual framework whose starting point is the notion 
that the main asset possessed by RBSOs is their knowledge/technology (Shane, 2001) and 
that, therefore, firms’ decisions will be influenced by two types of factors: (a) those related 
with the technology and the nature of knowledge underlying it (Dosi, 1988; Malerba and 
Orsenigo, 1993); (b) those related with conditions that enable firms to capture the value 
from their technology (Arora et al., 2001; Gans and Stern, 2003; Teece, 1986). More 
specifically, we propose that the “technological imperatives” associated with the nature of 
the knowledge being exploited are likely to have a strong impact upon and thus 
condition/shape the commercialisation strategy adopted by the RBSO. But, since the 
capacity to profit from innovation requires going beyond the sole consideration of those 
imperatives, we also propose that the nature, location and mode of deployment of a set of 
non-technological competences and resources (described in the literature as 
“complementary assets”) will equally influence the RBSOs’ strategic choices. In addition, 
we propose that some features related with RBSOs academic origin and founders’ 
background are likely to influence the decision process, namely through their impact upon 
the above mentioned dimensions (Vohora et al., 2004). The entrepreneurs’ previous 
experience and networks can equally have a lasting effect on the ability to pursue with the 
chosen strategy (Barringer et al., 2005; Mosey and Wright, 2007; Wiklund and Shepherd, 
2005). 
In line with this framework, we advance that RBSOs decision regarding the 
commercialisation strategy will be influenced by four types of factors: (1) nature of 
knowledge being exploited; (2) appropriability conditions, i.e. capacity to protect the 
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technology; (3) location and control of key complementary assets; (4) characteristics of the 
source environment, expressed both through the direct or indirect influence of the parent 
organisation and through the impact of founders background upon the firm early 
competence base. A variety of other factors – e.g. associated with founder personal 
characteristics, with funding modes and sources, with institutional incentives or 
government support policies and other environmental influences – may potentially have 
some influence on RBSOs decisions. However, we decided to focus on the more structural 
factors, which we expect to have a shaping effect upon the new company and therefore to 
be more powerful as determinants of this type of commercialisation strategy. These factors 
may impact differently upon the decision to target a given market and upon the ability to 
operate in that market (at a steady state) as the firm main business. We also advance that 
the start-up choice made by firms regarding the mode of commercialisation of their 
technologies will have an imprinting effect, thus contributing to determine firms’ 
subsequent activity.  
In the next sections we present in detail the theoretical foundations of this framework and 
formulate several hypotheses regarding how these factors influence the commercialisation 
strategy of RBSOs, focusing on the decision to target the market for technologies, which 
we will label as “technology market (commercialisation) strategy”. 
3.1. The impact of the nature of knowledge on RBSOs strategic decisions  
In order to address the impact of factors related with the nature of knowledge being 
exploited upon the commercialisation strategies of RBSOs, we draw on the economic 
theory of technological change and particularly on the approach introduced by the 
“technological regime” framework (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993; Nelson and Winter, 
1982). Malerba and Orsenigo (1997), drawing upon Dosi (1988) description of the 
dimensions that characterise a technological regime, operationalise it as a combination of 
some fundamental properties of technologies: opportunity and appropriability conditions, 
degree of cumulativeness of technological knowledge and characteristics of the knowledge 
base, which include: levels of pervasiveness/specificity, tacitness and complexity. 
Opportunity is defined as the ease of innovating for a given investment in search for new 
solutions; appropriability as the possibility to protect innovations from imitation; 
cumulativeness as the extent to which current innovative activities are based on knowledge 
and innovations developed in previous periods (Breschi et al., 2000).  
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These properties provided an analytical device to address the nature of the technologies 
being exploited by RBSOs. According to this literature, conditions of high technological 
opportunity, particularly when associated with pervasiveness, high appropriability and low 
cumulativeness appear to be the most favourable for small entrants exploring new 
technologies (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993; Marsili, 2002; Winter, 1984). When we consider 
exclusively the entry conditions regarding the nature of technology, it is to be expected that 
firms willing to operate in markets for technology will have stringent requirements 
concerning level of opportunity, pervasiveness and also of appropriability, since formal 
appropriation mechanisms are often the only effective means of protection for small firms 
(Hall, 2005). This argument is supported by the very limited research that took into 
consideration the impact of the nature of technology upon the strategic decisions of 
technology intensive companies. For instance, Hicks and Hedge (2005) concluded that 
small patent-based specialist suppliers that manage to survive and have long lasting success 
in the markets for technology, develop technology that is more general purpose, has a 
broader range of applications, has higher quality and is also more basic and closer to 
science. Similarly, Gambardella and Giarratana (2007), drawing on Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg (1995) analysis of general-purpose technologies, concluded that the presence of 
those technologies favour technology trade, and thus that they are more likely to be 
licensed. Conversely, the generality of the technology can have a negative impact on new 
product development, because it makes it less suitable for specific application. Additionally, 
Shane (2001) found that the exploration of more important (measured through the 
economic value of invention), more radical and broader inventions was more likely to be 
conducted through a new firm.  
RBSOs origin may provide them with the conditions to fulfil some of these requirements, 
although some variety is to be expected in that respect. In fact, since RBSOs are created to 
exploit new technological opportunities derived from academic research, it can be assumed 
that they will be operating under high opportunity conditions (Malerba and Orsenigo, 
1993), as well as that scientific advances are often their main source of technological 
opportunity, as opposed to technological advances originating from the industry (Klevorick 
et al., 1995). The fact that firms are exploiting knowledge originating from academic 
research has three types of implications. First, knowledge that originates from outside the 
industry is less likely to be cumulative and when non-cumulative knowledge plays a more 
important role as source of opportunity, new firms are better positioned in relation to 
incumbents (Winter 1984). Second, new scientific knowledge is likely to be easier to 
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appropriate, either because it benefits from the “natural excludability” often associated 
scientific discoveries (Zucker et al., 1998); or because its actual novelty and its abstract and 
codified nature makes patenting more viable (Saviotti, 1998). Third, new scientific 
knowledge – particularly the one associated with more basic research – tends to be generic 
in nature (Klevorick et al., 1995), opening up of a variety of search trajectories (Saviotti, 
1998). This also means that these technologies are likely to be characterised by high 
pervasiveness, i.e. the possibility of using the same core knowledge in a variety of 
applications (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993). In addition when pervasiveness is high, 
cumulativeness may not be a deterrent for new entrants, since diversified and specialist 
firms occupying different niches may co-exist, assuming different (and often 
complementary) strategic positionings, as the cases of biotechnology and more recently 
nanotechnology amply document (Orsenigo et al., 2001; Zucker et al., 2007).  
The above discussion supports the formulation of a number of hypotheses concerning the 
impact of the nature of knowledge on RBSOs decisions on the commercialisation strategy. 
The presence of general purpose or pervasive technologies can provide firms with a 
“platform” that supports a continuous stream of developments (Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg, 1995), which is critical for firms that intend to operate in technology markets 
(TM) in a sustained way. On the other hand, more generic technologies also tend to be 
more distant from applications and thus to be more difficult or take longer to convert into 
products (Gambardella and Giarratana, 2007). Therefore: 
H1a. RBSOs are more likely to be in TM when they have pervasive technologies. 
Technologies with a greater component of new knowledge can be more valuable for 
potential acquirers and thus offer a competitive advantage in the TM. Given their novelty 
they also have a greater possibility of being patented, as well as to provide more valuable 
patents (Shane, 2001), which, as we will see below, is equally important when operating in 
TM.   
H1b. RBSOs are more likely to be in TM when they are exploring technologies that involve a high 
component of new knowledge. 
Finally, since RBSOs technological competences are largely embodied in the founders, the 
type of technological experience and networks these possess also contribute to the nature 
of technological knowledge present in the firm (Ensley and Hmieleski, 2005). It can be 
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argued that RBSOs that only have founders with academic research experience, as opposed 
to technological experience in industry, will be more likely to prefer to engage in research 
activities and build a technological portfolio, rather than to engage in the activities required 
to transform that technology in products, which require different skills (Marsili, 2002).  
H1c. RBSOs are more likely to be in TM when they are created by founders whose technological 
backgrounds are exclusively academic. 
3.2. Factors related with capturing value from the technologies  
Despite the critical importance of the knowledge/technology asset, the transformation of 
technologies into products and their commercialisation requires the consideration of other 
aspects that are instrumental in enabling firms to capture the value from their technologies. 
This question has been addressed in greater detail by the strategic management of 
technology literature and particularly by the branch that focus on the markets for 
technology (e.g. Arora et al., 2001; Gans and Stern, 2003).  
This literature draws a great deal on Teece (1986) seminal approach to the alternatives and 
also the hazards faced by firms in the introduction of their innovations in the market. The 
key dimensions of Teece analysis – the appropriability conditions and the nature, location 
and mode of deployment of a set of specialised non-technological competences and 
resources, that cannot be easily acquired in the market but are needed to capture rents from 
the innovation, labelled “complementary assets” – are retained as the basic analytical 
structure. Following Teece, the combination between these two factors is at the root of 
recent research on the conditions faced by young firms commercialising new technologies 
(Gans and Stern, 2003; Giuri and Luzzi, 2005; Novelli and Rao, 2007). However, these 
approaches move beyond Teece, by proposing that, in some conditions, it is possible for 
(small) innovating firms to avoid the ownership of specialised assets and still capture rents 
from their innovations, due to the development of the markets for technology (Arora et al., 
2001). 
3.2.1. Research on commercialisation strategies of technology intensive firms 
Maybe the most comprehensive analysis was the one conducted by Gans and Stern (2003), 
who discuss the conditions in which new firms should compete directly in the product 
market with established firms; and those in which they should enter into agreements with 
them to take the technology to the market. One key aspect of this approach is that it 
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explicitly considers the possibility that established firms both control key complementary 
assets and have an incentive to appropriate the innovation, thus making alliances with them 
potentially more risky. The drivers behind the choice are, therefore, the capacity to 
preclude imitation by incumbents, and the extent to which incumbents own 
complementary assets that contribute to the value proposition of the technology.  
This issue has been empirically addressed by Gans et al. (2002) and a few other authors 
(Gambardella and Giarratana, 2007; Giuri and Luzzi, 2005; Kollmer and Dowling, 2004; 
Novelli and Rao, 2007; Pries and Guild, 2007). These authors typically address the case of 
patent-based small firms and consider the range of strategic options open to them and the 
factors that influence their strategic behaviour. Their research puts some emphasis on 
identifying and delimiting a strategy that focuses on technology trade and on distinguishing 
it from strategy(ies) focusing on product/service development. The distinguishing element 
between what can synthetically described as “technology market” and “product market” 
strategies is always whether the technology is sold as a disembodied good, or is 
incorporated into physical artefacts. But the way the strategies are defined depends on the 
way the various authors address the modes on which such incorporation takes place; and 
the relationship that the small supplier establishes with the buyers of the technology. In 
particular, the nature of the discussion on the role of specialised complementary assets 
depends on whether the authors focus exclusively on the in-house development of these 
assets, or also consider the possibility of establishing agreements with their owners. In our 
view this is a non negligible issue. In fact, Gans and Stern (2003) important insight about 
incumbents who have an incentive to expropriate the innovation, suggests that the viability 
of establishing such agreements in relatively advantageous conditions can be a key element 
in decisions on the commercialisation strategy.  
Additional contributions come from the literature on technology licensing that discusses 
the conditions in which firms decide whether or not to license their technology, and how 
such licensing takes place (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003; Arora and Merges, 2004; Gambardella 
et al., 2007; Kollmer and Dowling, 2004). While most of this literature does not focus 
specifically on start-up companies, firm size or age often emerge as an important 
dimension in the decision process: strategies of small/young firms are found to be diverse 
from those of larger established firms and tend to be more strongly influenced by the level 
of IP protection and the conditions in the market for downstream assets. 
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On the whole, these various streams of literature seem to converge in the conclusion that 
the appropriability regime and the access to complementary assets (under various forms) 
are key elements in firms decision concerning the modes of technology commercialisation 
and that small technology intensive firms – and especially start-ups – given their limited 
resources and reduced bargaining power, are particularly vulnerable to conditions at these 
levels. They also suggest that, while the decision to concentrate on technology trade, 
avoiding the development of production/commercialisation assets, can be a favourable 
strategy to new entrants endowed with strong technological competences, this strategy has 
quite stringent requirements. These concern both the characteristics of the technology (e.g. 
its novelty, uniqueness and the ability to make its advantages known to potential buyers) 
and the strength of the IP protection. The strategy also has risks, mainly derived from 
engaging in contractual agreements with more powerful companies that may have an 
incentive to appropriate the technology. Given these risks and requirements, technology 
intensive start-ups should consider carefully the circumstances surrounding the 
commercialisation process and the alternatives open to them.   
Thus, in order to fully understand the conditions that influence the RBSOs decision 
process, it is necessary to look in more detail into these aspects of the appropriability 
regime and access to complementary assets that are most relevant for this category of 
firms. 
3.2.2. The impact of appropriability regime on RBSOs strategic decisions 
The appropriability regime can be defined as the conditions concerning the protection of 
intellectual property assets against imitation, either through legal mechanisms (e.g., patents, 
copyright, formal non-disclosure agreements) or “natural” barriers to imitation, afforded by 
characteristics of the technology (tacitness, difficulty in reverse engineering) (Pisano and 
Teece, 2007; Zucker et al., 1998). In general, higher appropriability conditions increase the 
likelihood that companies earn profits from their innovation. But appropriability levels 
differ between sectors (Hall, 2005) and the appropriability mechanisms that are available 
and effective also vary (Hurmelina-Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 2007).  
While there is some debate about the means through which small technology intensive 
companies can protect their intellectual assets, there is more agreement on the literature 
about the case of small technology suppliers, who wish to sell or license their technology. 
Legal protection, namely through patents, is regarded as indispensable (Arora and Merges, 
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2004; Gans et al., 2002), even if it is recognised that these firms may find it difficult to 
withstand cases of litigation. In fact, strong IP protection through patents, not only 
defends the supplier from expropriation, but also facilitates technology trade, by reducing 
the asymmetry of information that characterise transactions in technology markets (Arrow, 
1962) and thus lowering transaction costs for both suppliers and buyers (Gambardella and 
Giarratana, 2007).  
The above discussion enables us to put forward some hypotheses concerning the impact of 
appropriability conditions on RBSOs commercialisation strategies. First of all it suggests 
that legal protection through patents is critical for RBSOs operating in the markets for 
technology. However, appropriability conditions and effectiveness of patents as a 
protection mechanism differ between industries, which mean that the appropriability 
regime prevailing in a given industry will constrain the actual presence of markets for 
technology and RBSOs ability to operate in these markets. Thus, entrepreneurs’ 
perceptions about the appropriability conditions in the industry segment where they are 
willing to operate may influence their strategic choice. Therefore: 
H2a. RBSOs are more likely to be in TM if they operate in sectors where level of appropriability is 
(perceived as) higher. 
While patent protection is usually described as the most effective mode of IP protection 
for RBSOs operating in TM, patents may not be a distinctive feature since they may also be 
used by firms developing and selling new products, as protection against imitation or for 
other strategic reasons (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006). However, the latter may have more 
possibilities to resort to alternative protection mechanisms and thus may give relatively less 
importance to patents or attribute them different roles (Cohen et al., 2000). Therefore, we 
can also hypothesise that:  
H2b. RBSOs that operate in TM are more likely to have patents and to attribute them higher 
importance as protection mechanisms (as compared with other mechanisms). 
The conditions, on which the knowledge was developed, namely the role effectively played 
by the parent research organisation, are also relevant, since they may influence both the 
nature of the knowledge and their protection status. It can be argued that when the 
knowledge being exploited was mostly developed still in the research organisation (as 
opposed to being mostly developed in the new firm on the basis of founders’ tacit 
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knowledge) there is a greater possibility that it was patented. In fact, not only new scientific 
knowledge is, in principle, more patentable, but research organisations are putting growing 
emphasis on patenting (Wright et al., 2007). These patents are often transferred or licensed 
to the new firm, granting it protection from start-up. In addition, patents filed by a reputed 
research organisation can have a function of quality endorsement of RBSOs (Lichtenthaler 
and Ernst, 2007). Thus presence of parent patents creates favourable conditions for 
operating in TM. This option may be further encouraged by the fact that inventions 
originating from the university tend to be more fundamental, generating patents of an 
embryonic nature, still needing substantial development before commercial application 
(Thursby et al., 2001). Therefore: 
H2c. RBSOs are more likely to be in TM when they start-up with technology protected by patents 
granted to the parent organisation. 
3.2.3. The impact of complementary assets on RBSOs strategic decisions 
New firms engaging in the transformation of their technology into marketable products or 
services are confronted with the need to gain access (building or acquiring from others) to 
a number of non-technological assets (physical assets or knowledge and skills) that are 
necessary to sell a complete product or service: e.g., manufacturing capacity, marketing, 
sales and distribution, regulatory knowledge (Teece, 1986). Access to assets that are 
external to the firm can be done through market acquisition or through alliances with the 
owner (Aggarwal and Hsu, 2009). Those assets can be generic and supplied by the market 
in competitive conditions; or co-specialised to the innovation (Teece, 1986). The latter may 
not be readily available in the market, since their owners try to achieve control over them, 
and they may also be difficult to imitate, because they are built on the basis of a process of 
learning within the firm (Rothaermel and Hill, 2005).  
The basic line of argument when discussing the commercialisation strategy of small 
technology-intensive firms is that when appropriability regimes are weak (and thus 
imitation relatively easy) the possibility to capture rents from the innovation depends on 
(privileged) access to complementary assets, specialised to the innovation, that are required 
to produce and commercialise it (Teece, 1986). New entrants will thus face a choice: they 
can build the key complementary assets internally; they can try to gain access to them, 
through market transactions or through alliances; or else they can avoid engaging in 
downstream activities at all (Arora et al., 2001). This choice can be addressed at two levels: 
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(a) that of the viability of gaining access to these assets in reasonably favourable conditions; 
and (b) that of the objectives pursued by the firm, i.e. whether its founders are willing to 
engage in a type of activity that requires downstream assets. These levels are not 
independent and it is their combined consideration that may contribute to explain RBSOs 
decisions.  
As we saw above, the literature that deals with firms’ positioning relatively to 
complementary assets (e.g. Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; Gans and Stern, 2003; Pries and 
Guild, 2011; Rothaermel and Hill, 2005) suggests that when key non-technological assets 
such as manufacturing capacity, marketing competences, sales and distribution facilities, 
regulatory experience, are perceived as controlled by existing firms, new firms will have a 
greater incentive to operate exclusively in the TM. Therefore, we can formulate the 
hypothesis that: 
H3a. RBSOs are more likely to be in TM when downstream complementary assets perceived as key to 
capture the value from the technology are controlled by existing firms. 
But the decision can also be influenced by the difficulty to build/acquire these assets, even 
if they are not controlled by incumbents. One basic element in this process is the type of 
competences present in the founding team, or those that can be mobilised through its 
networks (Mosey and Wright, 2007). Firms find it easier to build or gain access to assets in 
areas in which they already have previous knowledge (Vohora et al., 2004). Because RBSOs 
often lack non-technological skills and networks they will need to undertake greater efforts 
at this level. While firms may subsequently recruit people with the additional competences, 
at early stages the knowledge base of the firm is largely composed of the competences of 
the founding team. Thus, RBSOs whose founders have no previous industrial experience 
and/or no management competences may prefer to operate in TM: 
H3b. RBSOs are more likely to be in TM when they do not possess the skills/networks to develop 
downstream complementary assets or access them in favourable conditions. 
4. Empirical analysis 
In this section we will test the hypotheses formulated above about the conditions that 
influence the adoption of a technology market commercialisation strategy by RBSOs, 
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addressing both the factors that are expected to influence the decision to target technology 
markets and those that are expected to influence the ability to operate in those markets.  
4.1. Sample and data 
The hypotheses are tested examining the strategies adopted by a group of 80 RBSOs from 
six European countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and United Kingdom), 
selected from national databases on RBSOs, put together by the teams involved in the 
PICO project. The concept of spin-off adopted was the one defined in Mustar et al. (2006): 
new ventures created on the basis of formal or informal transfer of technology or 
knowledge generated by public research organisations.   
The sample selection followed a two step process. A first set of firms was selected from the 
above databases on the basis of two criteria: age and “growth ambition”. Since growth was 
not the focus of this research and considering the age of firms and the fact that the type of 
technologies being exploited may take some time to reach the market and start producing 
revenues, ambition to grow was judged to be more appropriate than actual growth. Only 
RBSOs that were at least 5 years and no more than 13 years old were included, in order to 
guarantee that the firm had survived the first critical years and achieved a reasonable level 
of development, but was not too distant from start-up, to limit the retrospective bias. The 
second criteria intended to exclude “life style companies” – i.e. firms created as side-
business by founders whose main occupation remains in the academic sphere – and to 
retain firms that started-up with “an ambition to grow” (Delmar et al., 2003; Wiklund et al., 
2003). Since it would not be possible identify firms denoting “growth-orientation” directly 
from a population, we defined the legal form of incorporation as a proxy to it, assuming 
growth-oriented companies are likely to wish to attract external financing and therefore 
also more likely to start up under (or adopt in the early years) a legal form – which varies 
between countries – that is flexible towards the capital/ shareholder structure. From this 
first set of firms we finally extracted a stratified sample of 80 companies, ensuring diversity 
in terms of country origin and firm size and activity. The distribution by country assumed 
four situations: (a) large countries with high RBSO activity – United Kingdom and France, 
which contributed with 22 and 20 firms respectively; (b) small countries with high RBSO 
activity – Belgium, with 15 firms; (c) large countries with low RBSO activity – Italy, with 13 
firms; (d) small countries with low RBSO activity – Portugal and Slovenia, with 6 and 4 
firms respectively. Regarding the latter, the final selection took into account the objectives 
of the research. Since commercialisation strategies differ across industries, it aimed at 
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guaranteeing some sectoral diversity. Heterogeneity was also sought in terms of activities 
performed, in order to encompass firms operating or willing to operate in product and in 
technology markets. In addition, both firms with and without patents were included. While 
recent work in commercialisation strategy focuses on companies that patented, we were 
interested in looking at both groups and investigating the role of patents in the strategic 
choice.  
The empirical investigation draws on data purposefully collected through questionnaire 
based interviews, conducted with the founders in 2007. Each interview lasted between 2 
and 3 h and permitted to obtain unique data on firm’s activity (early, current and expected 
in future), IP protection, origin of technology and source of technological opportunities, 
technological relationships with parent, presence/control of downstream complementary 
assets, background and competences of founders and management team and financial 
resources. Face to face interviews were conducted instead of a mail survey, since it was 
considered that the scope and complexity of the data being collected required a closer 
interaction with the respondents, in order to guarantee the quality and completeness of the 
questionnaire (questionnaire pre-tests confirmed this notion). While a closed question 
format was retained, to ensure data comparability across cases, this approach often enabled 
a more qualitative perspective on the firms’ decisions. 
The final sample was composed of 80 firms, 24 of which declared to have targeted the 
market for technologies at start-up. It included firms in biotechnology (25), software (23), 
instruments (15), electronics (10) and a residual category of “others” (include: 
energy/sustainability, materials, cartographic systems, fine chemicals and sports 
equipment). About 25% of the firms were 10 years old or more, while about one half were 
between 5 and 7 years old. Regarding the activities performed, as expressed by the main 
source of revenue at the time of the interview: 38.8% firms mentioned services, 30% 
products, 16.3% licenses and 15% did not have any revenue yet (these firms relied, directly 
or indirectly, on external sources of finance, such as external capital, public funding, 
founders additional activities). Only about one half of the firms had already completed the 
development of the first technology/product, so the firms’ expectation regarding the main 
source of revenue in the future is also relevant: 53.8% expected to have products, 27.5% 
licenses and 18.8% services. Thus 45% of the firms anticipated that the main source of 
revenue in the future would be different from the current one. Among these, 12 firms 
(33.3%) expected to switch to licensing as main source of revenue.  
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The majority of the firms mentioned that the technology was mostly developed at the 
parent organisation, being transferred (37.5%) or licensed (26.3%) to the new firm at start-
up and only about 1/3 considered that it was mostly developed in-house. Several of the 
former had their technology protected by patents filed by the parent organisation (36.3%). 
Still regarding IP protection, about half of the firms had filed own patent applications. 
Combining the two sources, we conclude that 68.8% of the firms had their technology 
protected by patents, either filed by the firm or by the parent organisation.  
4.2. Description of the model 
4.2.1. Data and variables 
The data obtained from the questionnaire enabled us to build a number of variables that 
are used as multidimensional measures of the nature of the knowledge, appropriability and 
complementary assets, founders’ background and influence of the parent organisation, as 
well as type of market targeted (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). 
4.2.2. Dependent variables 
Since our goal was to investigate both the conditions that influence RBSOs early decision 
to target the market for technologies and RBSOs ability to operate in that market (at a 
steady state) as the firm main business, we have defined two dependent variables, one for 
each stage of the analysis (Table 4.1).  
For the first stage (early decision) we used as dependent variable a measure of whether or 
not the RBSO decided to trade in the market for technologies at start-up, based on firms’ 
own evaluation of their business orientation at start-up. The variable TM at start is a 
categorical variable that distinguishes between firms that declared to have chosen “selling 
or licensing technology” as main business orientation at start-up and the firms that did not.  
For the second stage (operation as main business, at a steady state) we used as dependent 
variable a measure of RBSOs capacity to earn money from the market for technologies, 
based on firms’ expectation regarding the main source of future revenue. The variable TM 
as main business is a categorical variable that distinguishes between firms that expect to have 
licenses as main source of revenue and firms that do not. “Expected” source was chosen 
(instead of present source, which was also asked), to have a measure that is equivalent for 
firms in different stages of development, including firms that still do not have any revenue, 
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or in which services are the only source of income while the technology is being developed. 
Firms still in earlier stages are thus answering about a more stabilised situation, towards 
which they are working. Expectations may always not be fulfilled, but we can assume that 
the factors that explain the ability to earn money in the market for technologies will already 
be at work for firms that conducting their activities in order to achieve this objective. 
Tabel a 14 Table 4.1 - Dependent variable. 
4.2.3. Independent variables 
4.2.3.1. Appropriability measures. 
The assessment of appropriability conditions at start-up was based on two types of 
measures: a) of firms’ perceptions of the possibility and effectiveness of IP protection in 
the industry where they operate (IP Protection); b) of the actual presence of patents filed 
by the parent organisation and transferred or licensed to the new firm at start-up (Parent 
Patent).  
When measuring appropriability conditions at current stage, two new elements were added 
that reflect the activities conducted by the firm after start-up: c) firms’ perceptions of the 
importance of different IP protection mechanisms. The categories adopted were the ones 
defined in the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005): perceptions on the importance of patents 
(Patent Protection) and firms’ perception of the importance of other protection mechanisms, 
besides patents (No-Patent Protection), a meta variable obtained by averaging the importance 
attributed to secrecy, confidentiality agreements, lead-time, moving down the learning 
curve, (-Cronbach 0,69); d) the actual presence of patents filed by the firm, which was 
combined with the presence of parent patents, leading to a new variable (Patents) that 
reflects the fact that the technology protected by patents (own or from parent). Patent 
applications (US, European, PCT) were used instead of granted patents, given the stage of 
development of the firms: the vast majority of firms with patent applications had not yet 
been granted the patent. PCT patent applications, that is “international applications” filed 
 Variable name N Mean Std. Deviation 
The company operates on market for 
technologies at start-up (0=No; 1=Yes)  
Technology Market (TM) at start 80 0.30 0.461 
The main source of revenue expected in 
future are licenses (0=No; 1=Yes)  
Technology Market (TM) as Main 
Business  
80 0.27 0.449 
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under the system established by the Patent Cooperation Treaty, were included because the 
PCT route is increasingly used as a first step towards international patenting, namely by 
research organisations, due to the advantages afforded by the PCT system (Dernis and 
Khan, 2004). Indeed it was found that 20% of the firms that mentioned patents had only 
filed PCT applications. 
Since Patent Protection was highly correlated with IP Protection (R=-0.6) – suggesting that 
firms attributing greater importance to patents as a protection mechanism also considered 
IP protection in their industry more effective – only the latter was used. This is consistent 
with literature on small technology suppliers IPR that suggest that for this type of firms 
patents are the most (and often the only) effective IP protection mechanisms (Hall, 2005). 
4.2.3.2. Nature of knowledge measures. 
The level of novelty of the technology was measured by a seven-point variable – Novelty – 
that rates the extent to which firms considered that new knowledge had to be created to 
develop the technology (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990).  
To measure the pervasiveness of the technology, we used a proxy based on the firms’ 
assessment of the relative importance of advances in academic research as source of the 
opportunity behind the development of their technology (1 – low to 7 – high) (Breschiet 
al., 2000; Klevorick et al., 1995). Since the literature presents pervasiveness as associated 
with high technological opportunity (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993) and argues that 
technologies that are direct applications of scientific knowledge will tend to be more 
pervasive given the generic nature of that knowledge (Marsili, 2002), pervasiveness can be 
considered to be potentially higher when advances in academic research are more 
important as sources of technological opportunity. 
The founder’s technological competences were measured on the basis of data collected on 
the background of each founder at the time of creation (Ensley and Hmieleski, 2005). We 
built two variables: Academic Experience – sums up the number of founders with technical 
experience in academic research and the number of founders with a PhD degree, providing 
a measure of the strength of academic backgrounds; Technological Experience in Industry – a 
dummy variable valued 1 if at least one founder had previous technological experience in 
industry. 
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All these variables are based on data measured at the time of start-up, so they can be used 
in the analysis of early and current conditions. 
4.2.3.3. Complementary assets measures. 
Previous studies have used different proxies of complementary assets (CAs), for example: 
firm market share in a segment (Fosfuri, 2006); degree of interaction between R&D and 
production personal (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006); presence of production, marketing, 
sales facilities (Novelli and Rao, 2007). But only Gans et al. (2002), asked firms directly 
about their perceptions of the incumbent level of control upon CAs that are key to capture 
the value of their technology. While entrepreneurs may not have complete understanding 
of the competitive environment and while their perceptions may not reflect the actual 
situation in terms of ownerships/control of downstream of key CAs, it is their perceptions 
that influence decision making. Building on Gans et al. (2002) we also attempted to capture 
this dimension. 
To measure firms perception of level of incumbent control upon the different assets, we 
asked each firm to consider the resources and competences judged to be key to earn profits 
from the innovation in three domains – manufacturing; marketing and advertising; sales 
and distribution – and to rank, on a seven-point scale, the relative position of the RBSO 
and of other firms, regarding the control upon them. The scale was designed to consider a 
set of possibilities that ranged from: the complete control by the RBSO, that corresponds 
to its ownership of the assets (extreme left of scale); through situations where there is 
relative control of the RBSO, i.e. the balance of power is on the side of the RBSO, who 
can establish favourable or mutually favourable agreements with other companies to 
guarantee access; through the situation when the assets are freely available in the market at 
competitive prices (mid-point of scale); through situations where there is relative control by 
established firms, i.e. the balance of power is on the side of the established (usually large) 
firm, who still establishes agreements with the RBSO, but given its financial 
capacity/market power have a dominant position and can make the rules; to complete 
control by established firms that own the assets themselves and can (and possibly do) 
constrain access (extreme right of scale). 
A reliability analysis upon the variables obtained from the questionnaire – level of control 
upon manufacturing, upon marketing and upon sales – revealed a poor Cronbach alpha 
(0,54), that increased substantially when omitting the first one (0,72). This suggested the 
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existence of two underlying dimensions, which was corroborated by a 2-dimensional PCA 
(principal components analysis) upon them. Consequently, a final measure was obtained on 
the basis of two variables: level of incumbent control upon manufacturing directly obtained 
from the questionnaire (Control CA Manufacturing); level incumbent control upon 
commercialisation assets (Control CA Commercial), which corresponds to the mean of the 
variables relative to level of control upon marketing and to level of control upon sales. 
Data on perceptions on CA control were expected to reflect firms’ understanding of the 
current situation, but not have enough explanatory power regarding early decisions. With 
respect to the latter, non-technological competences in the founder team were used as a 
proxy to firms’ potential to build, acquire or gain access (through networks) to downstream 
complementary assets. Since academic entrepreneurs are described as having limited 
knowledge about and (in links to) the industry/market they are entering, this measure 
reflects the assumption that presence of founders with previous industrial background may 
increase such knowledge and networks (Ensley and Hmieleski, 2005). Thus, we used data 
collected on the background of entrepreneurs at the time of start-up to build a variable 
(Managerial Experience) that computes the number founding entrepreneurs with previous 
managerial experience in industry. 
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Tabel a 15 Table 4.2 - Independent variables. 
 Variable name N Mean Std. Deviation 
Appropriability Conditions 
    
Is the technology protected by patents filed 
by the parent?  
(0=No; 1=Yes)  
Parent Patent 79 0.39 0.491 
Possibility and effectiveness of IP 
protection in the industry / sector (7-1)  
IP Protection 79 3.38 2.021 
How important are the patents to protect 
innovations to the firm? (1-7) 
Patent Protection 80 5.05 2.449 
Mean importance of the following methods 
to protect innovations to the firm: a) 
confidentiality agreements; b) secrecy; c) 
lead-time advantage; d) learning curve? (1-7) 
No-Patent Protection 80 4.88 1.458 
The technology is protected by patents (own 
and/or parent) (0=No; 1=Yes)  
Patents 80 0.69 0.466 
Nature of Knowledge 
    
Importance of advances in academic 
research  resulting from applied sciences and 
engineering, as sources of technological 
opportunities (1-7) 
Pervasiveness 79 3.41 2.367 
To what extent did you have to create 
extensive new knowledge to develop your 
technology? (1-7)   
Novelty 80 4.08 1.756 
Number of Founders with PHD plus 
number of Founders with previous 
academic RandD experience (Min 0; Max 
13) 
Academic Experience 79 4.33 2.640 
The founders had previous technological 
experience in industry (0=No; 1=Yes)  
Technological Experience in 
Industry  
79 0.63 0.485 
Complementary Assets 
    
Number of Founders with previous 
managerial experience in industry (Min 0; 
Max 3) 
Managerial Experience  79 0.63 0.819 
Perception of level of incumbent control 
upon  the resources and competences key 
to earn profits from the innovations: mean 
of marketing/advertising (1-7) and 
sales/distribution (1-7)  
Control CA Commercial 80 2.89 1.717 
Perception of level of incumbent control 
upon the resources and competences key to 
earn profits from the innovations: 
manufacturing (1-7)  
Control CA Manufacturing 80 3.03 1.866 
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4.2.3.4. Control variables 
Considering that the sample included firms from different European countries the first 
variable that was considered as control was the country. Table 4.3 shows the distribution of 
firms for the groups of countries defined in section 4.1., categorised by being or not in the 
TM at start-up and expecting or not to have TM as main business in the future. In both 
cases there is no evidence suggesting that countries have a relationship to the dependent 
variables. The exact tests for the 4x2 tables were not statistically significant (country groups 
vs. TM at start, p=0.11, and country groups vs. TM as Main Business, p=0.28). Thus, country 
was not controlled for in the tests of the hypothesis. 
Considering that some industries are likely to be more favourable to the operation of 
markets for technologies (Coriat et al., 2003) the second variable that was considered as 
control was the industry. Table 4.4 shows the distribution for industry, categorised by being 
or not in the technology market at start-up and to expecting or not to have TM as main 
business in the future. Analyses of these data suggest that it is appropriate to include a 
control for being in the biotechnology industry in the tests of the hypotheses, as Fisher’s 
exact tests on the 2x2 contingency tables were significant (biotechnology/other industry vs. 
firm TM at start, p=0.001, and biotechnology/other industry TM as Main Business, p=0.000).  
Finally, age of firm at the time of the interviews (2007) was also elected as a control 
variable for the model at steady state. However, as age is a metric variable, a different 
approach was needed in order to check for its relevance. As the subsample for the firms 
that operate in the technology market is small (table 4.5) and there is no evidence that it 
can be considered drawn from a Gaussian population (Shapiro-Wilk test = 0.82, p= 0.000), 
the test on the difference of means could not be performed. Instead, the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for two independent samples was requested, but did not allow to conclude 
that firm age have significantly different distributions on each subsample (p=0.149). Thus, 
age of the firm is not controlled for in the tests of hypothesis. 
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Tabel a 16 Table 4.3 - Distribution for countries. 
Countries 
TM at start  TM as Main Business 
Yes No Total  Yes No Total 
UK + France 17 25 42  15 27 42 
Belgium 3 12 15  3 12 15 
Italy 1 12 13  1 12 13 
Portugal + Slovenia 3 7 10  3 7 10 
Total 24 56 80  22 58 80 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Tabel a 17 Table 4.4 - Distribution for type of industry. 
Sectors 
TM at start  TM as Main Business 
Yes No Total  Yes No Total 
Software 3 20 23  1 22 23 
Electronics 3 7 10  2 8 10 
Instruments 2 13 15  1 14 15 
Biotechnology 14 11 25  17 8 25 
Others 2 5 7  1 6 7 
Total 24 56 80  22 58 80 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Tabel a 18 Table 4.5 - Distribution for age. 
 Age 
 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Total 
TM as Main Business 
Yes 1 6 8 3 2 0 1 0 1 22 
No 1 7 15 12 5 8 3 2 5 58 
Total 2 13 23 15 7 8 4 2 6 80 
Source: Own calculations. 
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4.3. Empirical results  
To test our hypotheses we used a two stage approach. First, we focused on the conditions 
that influence RBSOs early decision to target the technology market and defined one 
model (Model 1), whose dependent variable is the main business orientation at start-up 
(TM at start) and whose independent variables are measures of:  
 appropriability: perception of appropriability regime in industry (IP Protection) and 
presence of a parent patent protecting the technology (Parent Patent); 
 nature of knowledge: Novelty and Pervasiveness of technology, as well as indirect 
measures such as strength of founders academic backgrounds (Academic Experience) 
and presence of founders with technical experience in industry (Technological 
Experience in Industry); 
 ability to build complementary assets: proxyed by the strength of non-technological 
competences in founding team (Managerial Experience). 
Second we addressed the conditions associated with being in the market for technologies as 
the RBSO main business. We defined another model (Model 2) whose dependent variable 
is “licensing as main source of revenue in the future”(TM as Main Business)and since in this 
case we are considering the firms already in operation, we included as independent 
variables:  
 new measures of appropriability: presence of patents (own or parent) protecting the 
technology (Patents) and firms’ perception of the importance of other protection 
mechanisms, besides patents (No-Patent Protection); 
 new measures of control over complementary assets: perceptions of control upon 
assets related with production and with commercialisation (Control CA Manufacturing 
and Control CA Commercial). 
 measure of imprinting effect: for this purpose, we used as independent variables the 
early decision to operate in technology markets (TM at start) and therefore excluded 
from this model the variables identified in Model 1 as explanatory of that decision 
and included the variables that were not found to have explanatory power for the 
early decision: IP Protection, Pervasiveness and Academic Experience. 
We run the models, using logistic regression due to the dichotomous nature of the 
dependent variables. Beforehand, presence of multicollinearity was checked for in two 
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ways: (i) by inspection of the correlation matrix and (ii) running the corresponding multiple 
regression models and requesting the colinearity diagnostics. There is no evidence of strong 
linear relationships between independent variables, and the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
never exceeds 2, far below the often recommended threshold of 10. Results can be found 
in appendix A1 and A2. 
Both models provide a good fit to the data: firstly, the chi-squared goodness-of-fit test for 
the change in the –2Loglikelihood value (which tests the null hypothesis that all logistic 
regression coefficients – except the constant – are zero) revealed to be statistically 
significant (model 1: 2(8) = 31.2, p < .001; model 2: 2(9) = 52.3, p < .001) which 
provides support for acceptance of both models as significant logistic regressions. 
Secondly, the overall rate of correct classification is rather high: around 87 percent for 
model 1 and 88 percent for model 2. Moreover, as it can be seen on Tables 4.6 and 4.7, 
observed sensibility (i.e. percentage of correctly classified cases within firms that operate in 
the technology market at start-up – model 1 – or expect to have TM as main business in 
the future – model 2) is very satisfactory, particularly for model 2 (around 70 percent, 16 
out of 23 firms, in model 1 and 81 percent, 17 out of 21 firms, in model 2). Thirdly, the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit statistic (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000) was also 
requested: the significance of the H-L statistic was found to be, in all models, relatively 
large, as desirable (model 1: 2(8) = 9.0, sig = 0.343; model 2: 2(8) = 2.3, sig = 0.972). 
Given the reduced dimension of the sample, as well as the ordinal nature of some of the 
variables, results will be cautiously interpreted and mainly in terms of the qualitative, rather 
than quantitative impact. 
Tabel a 19 Table 4.6 – Classification table of Model 1. 
 Predicted TM at start Percentage Correct 
 No Yes 
Observed TM at start    
No 50 3 94.3 
Yes 7 16 69.6 
Overall Percentage   86.8 
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Tabel a 2 0 Table 4.7 – Classification table of Model 2. 
 Predicted TM as Main Business Percentage Correct 
 No Yes 
Observed TM as Main Business    
No 51 5 91.1 
Yes 4 17 81.0 
Overall Percentage   88.3 
Table 4.8 presents the results of the logistic regression, which are discussed in greater detail 
below. 
Tabel a 21 Table 4.8 – Results of logistic regression. 
Variables 
Exp (B) 
Model 1 
 Model 2 
Parent Patent 4.853**  n.a. 
Novelty 1.810**  n.a. 
Technological Experience in Industry 0.106**  n.a 
Managerial Experience 2.772*  n.a. 
IP Protection 0.888  0.577* 
Pervasiveness 0.804  0.999 
Academic Experience 0.993  0.667 
Patents n.a.  0.327 
No-Patent Protection n.a.  1.289 
Control CA Commercial n.a.  1.950** 
Control CA Manufacturing n.a.  1.383 
TM at start n.a.  36.586*** 
Biotec 6.378**  25.455*** 
Constant 0.043**  0.015* 
Pseudo-R2Nagelkerke 0.476  0.715 
Valid N 76  77 
* Sig≤ 0.10; **  Sig ≤ 0.05; ***  Sig ≤ 0.01 
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4.3.1. Factors that determine early decision (Model 1) 
In the case of Model 1, estimated odd ratios, reported in table 8, provide strong support 
for the hypothesis that the novelty of technology (Novelty) increases the odds of opting for 
operating in the technology market (H1b). Regarding the impact of founders’ backgrounds 
on the nature of knowledge, our results (as expected) show an inverse (as the proportionate 
change of odds (Exp b) is below 1) and significant relationship between the founding 
team’s previous technical experience in industry (Technological Experience in Industry) and the 
decision to operate in the technology market. However, the strength of academic 
backgrounds of founding team (Academic Experience) was not found to have impact upon 
that decision. Thus, Hypothesis 1c was only partially supported. Considering the 
appropriability conditions, the results show that protection by patents filed by the parent 
increased the odds of opting for operating in the technology market, providing support to 
the hypothesis that protection by patents granted to the parent organisation is important 
for the decision to operate in TM (H2c). Regarding our proxy for the ability to build 
complementary assets, we found that, contrary to the expected, previous managerial 
experience in industry (Managerial Experience) increases the odds of opting for operating in 
the technology market. Thus Hypothesis 3b was not supported. 
Finally we find an industry effect in our analysis: the results show that the odds of opting 
for operating in the technology market increase significantly when the industry is 
biotechnology (Biotec), confirming that firms in this industry are more likely to opt for 
operating in the technology market than those in other industries. 
4.3.2. Factors that influence having TM as main business (Model 2) 
In the case of Model 2, regarding the appropriability conditions, the results show that 
perceptions of high appropriability regime in industry (IP Protection) increase the odds 
ofhaving licenses as main source of revenues in the future, providing support for 
Hypothesis 2a. The high correlation between IP Protection and Patent Protection suggests that 
firms that perceive a high level of appropriability in their industry also rate highly patents as 
protection mechanisms, providing also some support to Hypothesis 2b. However, in the 
model, the variable Patents have no significant impact, which indicates that the presence of 
patents, per se, do not differentiate firms that expect to be in the TM as main business. 
Thus, there is only partial support to Hypothesis 2b. As regards the control over 
complementary assets, we found that a higher level of incumbent control upon commercial 
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assets (Control CA Commercial) increased the odds of having licenses as main source of 
revenues, providing support for Hypothesis 3a. 
Finally, the results suggest a significant impact of an early business orientation towards 
Technology Market (TM at Start) on the odds of having licenses as main source of revenues 
in the future, confirming the importance of the imprinting effect of early decisions and 
suggesting the persistence of the factors that influenced them. 
An industry effect is also present: the results show, as in Model 1, that the odds of 
operating in the technology market increase significantly when the industry is 
biotechnology (Biotec). 
5. Discussion  
Regarding the conditions associated with adopting a technology market commercialisation 
strategy at start-up, the empirical research supported most of our hypothesis. Considering 
the nature of knowledge, it was found that this decision was more likely to be made when 
the technology involved a greater component of new knowledge (H1b), although the 
degree of pervasiveness of the technology did not appear to differentiate between RBSOs 
that choose to be in TM and those that did not (H1a). Nevertheless, pervasiveness was 
clearly relevant for the former: 90% attributed the highest rank to the respective variable. 
In addition RBSOs were more likely to opt for TM when the entrepreneurs had no 
previous technological experience in industry (H1c), although a greater strength of 
academic backgrounds did not offer additional explanatory power. These results are further 
supported by a closer analysis of the cases, which revealed that most of these firms spun-
off from large research universities and that, frequently, either the founding team, or the 
university team responsible for the development of the technology, involved highly reputed 
scientists. The influence of appropriability conditions at this stage was also confirmed: 
firms were more likely to opt for TM when the technology was mostly developed in the 
parent organisation and was protected by a patent filed by the parent (H2c). 
However, the results suggest that the decision to be in TM was more likely when founders 
with non-technological backgrounds were present in the entrepreneurial team, thus 
providing no support to the hypothesis that absence of skills/networks required to 
develop/access complementary assets would induce RBSOs to choose TM (H3b). A more 
detailed analysis of the actual cases confirmed that the RBSOs that opted for engaging in 
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this type of business frequently brought into the founding team at least one experienced 
individual from outside the academia (60% of the cases). The reason for this was that, 
while these RBSOs did not need to develop traditional marketing and commercialisation 
competences, they were nevertheless confronted with the need to sell their technology, 
which involves identifying potential technology acquirers, capturing their interest, devising 
the most adequate technology selling strategies and conducting complex negotiation 
processes, frequently with more powerful companies (Arora et al., 2001). Finally, the results 
also show that firms active in the biotechnology industry were more likely to opt for TMs 
at start-up and also to expect to have TM as main business in the future, although this not 
exclusive of them. In fact 42% of firms that choose to be in TM are non-biotech, this 
proportion decreasing to 23% when we consider the expectation of having TM as the main 
business.  
These results confirm the importance of a dimension often overlooked in research on 
commercialisation strategies: the nature of the knowledge being exploited (Nerkar and 
Shane, 2007). Some of these results also support the arguments about the parent 
technological influence, or more generally, about the relevance of RBSO features that are 
associated with their origin (Mustar et al., 2006). In particular, the impact of the presence of 
patents filed by the parent can be regarded as an indirect indicator of the significance of the 
technology developed in the academic context. The finding about the mixed composition 
of entrepreneurial teams is also important, since it suggests a higher than expected degree 
of strategic awareness among teams willing to target the technology market. 
Regarding the conditions associated with the ability to sustain this commercialisation 
strategy, the empirical results also partly support our hypotheses (Table 4.9). The results 
suggest than RBSO will be more likely to operate in TM as main business when key 
downstream complementary assets related to commercialisation are perceived as controlled 
by existing firms (H3a). These results are consistent with recent research that brings 
complementary assets into the empirical analysis (Gambardella and Giarratana, 2007; 
Novelli and Rao, 2007), but refine it, by confirming Gans et al. (2002) insight that it is 
control upon complementary assets – and not just their presence in-house – that is the key 
element on start-ups’ strategic decisions.  
The results concerning appropriability are more complex. They show that RBSOs will be 
more likely to operate in TM as main business when they perceive IP protection to be 
possible and effective in their industry (H2a). Moreover, the strong association between 
 105 
this indicator and the perception of importance of patents suggests that, in this case, 
patents are seen as the most important protection mode (H2b) – and in fact 91% of these 
firms attribute them the highest rank. This is consistent with the extensive literature that 
presents the ability to protect the technology as indispensable to operate in technology 
markets (Arora and Merges, 2004). However, contrary to what has been proposed in the 
literature (e.g. Gans et al., 2002), presence of patents, per se, does not differentiate between 
the firms that expect to have TM as their main business and those that do not. This 
departure from other studies may derive from the fact that the vast majority of them has 
focused exclusively on firms with patents, which was not the case here. Besides, this result 
does not lessen the relevance of patents for those RBSOs operating in TM – indeed 64% 
had filed patent applications (even if only 5% already had patents granted) and 76% relied 
on patents filed by the parent and transferred or licensed to the new firm, this implying that 
90% had some patent protection. It simply indicates that patenting appears to be a 
relatively widespread practice amongst RBSOs that are not “lifestyle companies”. What 
seems to be specific to RBSOs operating in TM is the role played by parent patents, which 
becomes apparent when we look into the particular cases. Not only firms start-up with a 
technology that is already protected by patents filed by the parent, but this protection holds 
while they are further exploiting knowledge that is more science-based and thus further 
from application, requiring a more substantial transformation. Thus we have companies 
that are still developing their technologies and have not yet filed own patents or, even if 
they did, have not yet been granted these patents. In the meanwhile these firms rely 
strongly on the protection offered by the patents they inherited from the parent and, in 
some cases, also on the temporary “excludability” afforded by the very novelty of their 
technologies, as proposed by Zucker et al. (1998). 
Thus, the empirical results provided total or partial support to most of the hypotheses 
formulated regarding the factors that influence RBSOs adoption and sustaining a 
technology marketing commercialisation strategy. Table 4.9 summarises these results, 
permitting us to conclude that, globally, factors related with the three main dimensions 
present in the conceptual framework – nature of knowledge, appropriability conditions and 
control over complementary assets – as well as with the transversal impact of the parent 
organisation and the entrepreneur’s competences upon these dimensions, are likely to have 
some influence upon the behaviour of RBSOs, in what concerns the mode of 
commercialisation of their technologies. 
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Tabel a 2 2 Table 4.9 –Hypotheses tested: support vs. rejection 
Hypotheses Support 
Nature of Knowledge 
H1a - Pervasiveness 
H1b - Novelty 
H1c  - Academic Backgrounds 
Appropriability Conditions 
 
No 
Yes 
Partial 
H 2a - Perceptions on Appropriability 
H 2b - Patent Protection 
H 2c - Parent Patents 
Yes 
Partial 
Yes 
Complementary Assets 
 
H 3a - Incumbent control CA Yes 
H 3b - Managerial Experience No 
The results obtained also show that early choices can indeed have an imprinting effect: an 
early decision to target technology markets increases the propensity to operate in this 
market in the future. However, they also suggest that the conditions that influence the early 
adoption of a commercialisation strategy may not necessarily be the same that influence the 
subsequent ability to sustain that strategy, although some of them appear to remain 
relevant. This is nevertheless an issue that requires more in-depth – possibly longitudinal – 
research. 
The analysis conducted has the limitation of being based on a small sample. This has 
implications from the statistical point of view, since when using logistic regression and 
therefore maximum-likelihood estimation of the parameters, larger samples are 
recommended. Because our objective is to take into consideration a combination of factors 
(measured in a multidimensional way), which we expected can provide a more 
comprehensive explanation of the phenomenon, it may be necessary to expand our sample, 
in order to increase the robustness of the results. However we should note that the results 
thus obtained revealed desirable statistical properties, as a fairly high percentage of 
correctly classified cases and adequate values for the goodness of fit statistics. 
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6. Conclusions and policy implications  
This paper addressed the commercialisation decisions of research-based spin-off firms, 
focusing on the case of companies that choose to target the market for technologies. The 
objective of this research was to develop and empirically test a comprehensive analytical 
framework that contributed to explain the conditions behind the emergence of a model of 
entrepreneurial behaviour that is becoming increasingly frequent in science-based fields, 
but is still largely underexplored.   
Combining insights from two streams of literature – economics of technological change 
and strategic management of technology – we discussed the conditions that can influence 
decision to adopt and ability to pursue with this commercialisation strategy; and advanced 
some theory-driven hypothesis regarding the key factors that are likely to determine RBSOs 
choice: nature of knowledge, appropriability conditions, location and degree of control 
upon complementary assets and characteristics of the (academic) source environment. Our 
analytical framework expands on previous ones, by taking in consideration a combination 
of factors that tend to be addressed separately and the respective impacts, as well as by 
bringing back into focus some aspects – namely those related with the nature of the 
knowledge being exploited – that are often overlooked.  
The results of a first empirical test of these hypotheses on a sample of 80 European 
RBSOs offer some preliminary insights into the conditions that are associated with RBSOs 
decision to adopt a technology market commercialisation strategy, as well as with their 
capacity to maintain this strategic orientation beyond the early stages, assuming the 
operation in technology markets as their main business. More specifically, the research 
suggests that particular attention should be paid to the following aspects: (i) the presence of 
stringent requirements in what concerns both the novelty of the technology being 
commercialised and the capacity to protect that technology since start-up, stressing the role 
played in such protection by patents already filed by the parent organisation; (ii) the 
situation in terms of access to downstream competences and resources that are necessary 
for commercialisation, in particular the degree to which incumbent firms control those 
assets; (iii) the set of competences encompassed by the founding team, pointing to a 
combination of a high level of scientific competences (given the technological 
requirements) with critical non-technological competences and networks (given the 
complex requirements of IP trade). The research also calls the attention to the impact of 
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early decisions, which can constrain firms’ subsequent evolution by reducing the margin for 
future choices.  
These results are still preliminary, being based on a relatively small sample. The small size 
of the sample and the limited number of firms operating in technology markets it 
encompasses, requires us to interpret the results with some care. However, this limitation is 
also the result of a decision to conduct direct interviews (as opposed to a more generic 
survey) and thus should be balanced against the advantages of this option. In fact, it 
enabled us to obtain more reliable and complete data on complex issues as well as to 
collect some additional, more qualitative information on the companies’ behaviour, which 
we deemed to be particularly important when testing a new conceptual framework. The 
more qualitative data provided additional, more grounded support to some of our 
hypothesis and enabled us to clarify some “puzzling” results obtained from our models, 
thus permitting a better understanding of the processes at work in these companies. This 
suggests two main lines to be followed in subsequent research: more in depth qualitative 
research on firms operating in the markets for technology, in order to go into greater depth 
into these processes, thus enabling us to refine our conceptual framework; which should 
subsequently be tested in a larger sample in order to increase the robustness of the results.  
Despite these limitations, we think that this research already contributes both conceptually 
and empirically for a better understanding of the factors behind firms’ decision to specialise 
in the production and sale of intellectual property. Thus, it adds to the still incipient 
research on this emergent model of entrepreneurial behaviour and also to recent research 
on the determinants of the commercialisation strategy of small technology-intensive firms. 
The research is also relevant for policy makers and practitioners. First of all because it 
brings into focus one of the less understood routes through which RBSOs perform the 
transformation of scientific and technological knowledge into economic value. Firms 
adopting this model of business have specific functions in the innovation system that 
should be considered more attentively by policy makers and, if judged relevant, should be 
sustained by adequate policies. Second because the type of factors that were found to 
influence the decision to operate in technology markets suggest that academic 
entrepreneurs may have an increasing propensity to operate under this model, which is 
favoured by the nature of the knowledge they often exploit and may be cognitively closer 
to their identity and culture. Given the relative novelty of this model of business, it is 
relevant to call the attention to the fact that it has specific – and sometimes very stringent – 
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requirements and, above all, it is important to offer some guidance to the actors who might 
be involved in the decision processes associated with creation and early development of 
this type of companies. This includes, both the entrepreneurs, who will have to consider 
carefully the circumstances surrounding the commercialisation process and assess the 
alternatives effectively open to them; and the support organisations operating in the 
academic context (such as TTOs or incubators) that often assist in these processes and can 
of have a determinant influence in the way they are conducted. Finally it also concerns 
policy makers, since different types of requirements may also require different policies, that 
contribute to reinforce the strengths and to ease the difficulties of small firms operating in 
technology markets. 
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Appendix A. VIF and correlations for the independent, control and dependent variables. 
 
Tabel a 2 3 Table A4.1 –VIF and Correlations for the independent, control and dependent variables- 
Model 1 
 VIF 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Dependent Variable             
(1) TM at start             
Independent Variables             
(2) Parent Patent 1.454 .39 **           
(3) IP Protection   1.416 -.31 ** -.42 **          
(4) Pervasiveness 1.566 .25 * .22 -.21         
(5) Novelty  1.227 .35 ** .22 -.31 ** .34 **        
(6) Academic Experience  1.084 .13 .09 -.22 .10 .16       
(7) Technological Experience in Industry 1.469 -.02 .30 ** -.11 -.07 .05  -.07     
(8)Managerial Experience 1.759 .28 * .45 -.36 ** .30 .12  .13  .45 **  
(9)Biotec 1.428 .35 ** .33 ** -.30 ** .44 ** .21  .08  .23 * .28* 
*Sig≤ 0.05; ** Sig ≤ 0.01 
 
Tabel a 2 4 Table A4.2 –VIF and Correlations for the independent, control and dependent variables- 
Model 2 
 VIF 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  
Dependent Variable                
(1)TM as Main Business                
Independent Variables                
(2) IP Protection 1.675 -.39 **              
(3) No-Patent Protection 1.130 -.04 .11             
(4) Patents 1.710 .29 * -.51 ** .05            
(5) Pervasiveness 1.350 .29 * -.22 -.04 .39 **           
(6) Academic Experience  1.118 .03 -.22 .06 .24 * .10         
(7) Control CA Commercial 1.065 .24 * -.16 -.05 .19 .15 .00       
(8) Control CA Manufacturing 1.565 .38 ** -.51 ** -.18 .42 ** .28 * .24 * .17     
(9) TM at start 1.252 .58 ** -.30 ** -.14 .17 .25 * .13 .07 .23 *   
(10)Biotec 1.638 .62 ** -.30 ** .10 .44 ** .44 ** .09 .17 .38 ** .33 ** 
*Sig ≤ 0.05; ** Sig ≤ 0.01  
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